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ARTICLES
BAD NEWS FOR THOSE PROCLAIMING THE
GOOD NEWS?: THE EMPLOYER'S AMBIGUOUS
DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE RELIGIOUS
PROSELYTIZING
Michael D. Moberly*
Then he told them: "Go into the whole world and proclaim
the good news to all creation."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII" or the
"Act")2 was this country's first comprehensive federal em-
ployment discrimination legislation.' It has since served as a
* B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock & Apple-
white, Phoenix, Arizona.
1. Mark 16:15 (New American). Although the quoted passage reflects the
Christian call to evangelism, the practice is also a tenet of other religious faiths.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Clarke, 848 F. Supp. 1452, 1453 (D. Neb. 1994) ("The
tenets of Al-Islam encourage its adherents to propagate the faith, proselytize to
nonbelievers, and generally engage in activities intended to benefit others.").
See generally Thomas C. Berg, Religious Speech in the Workplace: Harassment
or Protected Speech?, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 959, 964 (1999) (noting that
"many widespread religions in America proselytize").
This article addresses the legal ramifications of workplace proselytizing.
Although both a practicing attorney and a practicing Catholic, the author ex-
presses no view of the religious implications of the issue. See Marc D. Stern,
The Attorney as Advocate and Adherent: Conflicting Obligations of Zealousness,
27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1363, 1367 (1996) (observing, apparently without irony,
that "the lawyer.., is not necessarily a religious expert"). Several insightful
discussions of the religious aspects of proselytizing are collected in SHARING THE
BOOK: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF PROSELYTISM
(John Witte Jr. & Richard C. Martin eds., 1999).
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
3. See Piva v. Xerox Corp., 376 F. Supp. 242, 246 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (de-
scribing Title VII as "the first comprehensive federal legislation in the field of
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model for a number of other state4 and federal antidiscrimina-
tion laws.5 Enacted to address discrimination that had been
experienced by various minority groups,6 Title VII prohibits
employers from discriminating against employees and appli-
cants on a number of bases,7 including their religious obser-
vances, practices, and beliefs.8
Concern over the issue of race discrimination was the
primary motivating force behind the enactment of Title VII,9
with religion arguably included as a protected class "only by
virtue of the nation's long history of considering [religious ob-
employment discrimination"); Smith v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515,
518 (N.D. Okla. 1970) (indicating that the Act is "generally heralded as the first
effort by the United States Government to outlaw discrimination in private em-
ployment on the basis of race, religion, national origin and sex").
4. See Lavalley v. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co., 692 A.2d 367, 369 (Vt. 1997)("Many states have enacted employment discrimination laws patterned in whole
or in part on Title VII."); cf. Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 273 n.32 (10th
Cir. 1987) ("Most state civil rights statutes encompass the protections of Title
VII, and many also prohibit discrimination on the basis of age and handicap.")
(quoting Charles W. Newcom, Hishon v. King & Spalding: Discrimination in
Professional Partnerships, 62 DENV. U. L. REV. 485, 492 (1985)).
5. See Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680, 683 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussing
"other employment statutes modeled after Title VII"); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84
F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1996) (referring to "other federal employment discrimi-
nation statutes that are modeled on Title VII").
6. See EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 387 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (D. Colo. 1975)
("The focus of Title VII, as originally enacted in 1964, was the prompt vindica-
tion of individual minority rights in employment."), rev'd on other grounds, 535
F.2d 1213 (10th Cir. 1976); Warshafsky v. Journal Co., 216 N.W.2d 197, 203
(Wis. 1974) ("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted in response to
the social and economic injustices suffered by women and other minority groups
in employment.").
7. See generally Davis v. KGO-T.V., Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13, 16 (Ct. App.
1996) (observing that "It]he majority of the laws prohibiting discrimination in
employment are set forth in ... Title VII"), superceded on other grounds, 931
P.2d 261 (Cal. 1997), affd, 950 P.2d 567 (Cal. 1998).
8. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a) (1994); see also EEOC v. Davey
Tree Surgery Co., 671 F. Supp. 1260, 1264 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment based on relig-
ion."); Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Iowa 1990) (stating
that "the holder of a bona fide religious belief] is a member of a protected
class").
9. See Contreras v. City of L.A., 656 F.2d 1267, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Con-
gress' primary objective in passing Title VII was to eliminate race-related em-
ployment criteria."); Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 489 F.
Supp. 782, 784 (S.D. Cal. 1980) ("Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964
primarily to prohibit various forms of racial discrimination throughout the na-
tion. Specifically, Title VII of the Act was designed to eliminate such discrimi-
nation in employment practices.") (footnotes omitted), rev'd on other grounds,
648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1981).
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servance] a fundamental right."" Nevertheless, religious dis-
crimination can be as pernicious as discrimination on the ba-
sis of race or discrimination based on "any other characteris-
tic which ignores a person's unique status as an individual
and treats him or her as a member of some arbitrarily-defined
group."'2 Thus, race and religion are generally treated simi-
larly for Title VII purposes."
In fact, employees claiming to have been discriminated
against on the basis of their religious beliefs and practices ac-
tually receive more favorable treatment than other classes of
employees protected by Title VII in one important respect.
14
Specifically, the Act not only proscribes religious discrimina-
tion to the same extent it prohibits discrimination on the ba-
10. Kenneth G. Frantz, Religious Discrimination in Employment: An Ex-
amination of the Employer's Duty to Accommodate, 19 DET. C. L. REV. 205, 206
n.8 (1979); cf. Am. Motors Corp. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations,
305 N.W.2d 62, 72 (Wis. 1981) ("Congress, without bothering seriously to con-
sider or to document the problem, included religious discrimination as one of
the employment practices proscribed by Title VII.") (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Harry T. Edwards & Joel H. Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of
Arbitration Under Title VII, 69 MICH. L. REV. 599, 600 (1971)).
11. See Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d
1094, 1100 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that "the [Supreme] Court tends to refer to
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin as [if] they
are equally nefarious"); cf. Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of Sacramento County,
604 P.2d 1365, 1389 (Cal. 1980) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (asserting that "religious
discrimination has been a pervasive element in American life from early colo-
nial days"). But see Md. Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1076 (4th Cir.
1993) ("Of all the criteria by which men and women can be judged, the most
pernicious is that of race.").
12. Ramirez v. P.R. Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 699 (1st Cir. 1983) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 93-913, at 40 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2849).
But cf. Casarez v. Texas, 913 S.W.2d 468, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (McCor-
mick, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the history of religious discrimination in
this Country does not occupy the same plane as the history of race and sex dis-
crimination"); Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 10, at 602 n. 10 (stating that "most
of the [congressional] testimony on religious discrimination indicated that
the.., problem was slight and diminishing").
13. See Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1018 (4th Cir.
1996); Reid v. Memphis Publ'g Co., 468 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1972); cf. Sarin v.
Raytheon Co., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 856, 858 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting
that "Title VII similarly protects individuals against employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of religion [and national origin]").
14. See Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1018 (noting that "the definition of 'religion'
in [Title VIII places it in a special category"); Winn v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 484 A.2d 392, 400 n.9 (Pa. 1984) (describing "the failure of an employer to
make reasonable accommodation to an employee's religious observances or prac-
tices" as a "unique category of discrimination law").
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sis of race and other protected characteristics," but it also
places an affirmative obligation on employers to attempt to
accommodate their employees' religious beliefs and prac-
tices. There is no comparable obligation in the case of race 7
or any other protected Title VII class, 8 although both the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")'9 and the Rehabilita-
tion Act2° impose roughly analogous obligations21 in the dis-
15. See Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1018; cf. Theresa M. Beiner & John M. A.
DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious Employee, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 577, 590 (1997) ("While some commentators have distinguished re-
ligion claims because they are based on 'chosen' beliefs as opposed to innate
characteristics such as race or sex, Title VII makes no such distinction.") (foot-
note omitted).
16. See EEOC v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (C.D.
Ill. 2000); Breech v. Ala. Power Co., 962 F. Supp. 1447, 1456 (S.D. Ala. 1997),
affd, 140 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court has noted that "[tihe
reasonable accommodation duty was incorporated into the statute, somewhat
awkwardly, in the definition of religion." Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479
U.S. 60, 63 n.1 (1986); see also Nottleson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 423 F. Supp.
1345, 1347 (E.D. Wis. 1976) ("The necessity of accommodation is found within
the definition of religion .... ).
17. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 198, 208
n.21 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that "protection [from race discrimination] ... does
not include any form of 'accommodation"), rev'd, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998);
Vikram David Amar, State RFRAs and the Workplace, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
513, 515 (1999) ("Unlike Title VII's race.., discrimination provisions, the anti-
discrimination provision concerning religion expressly requires 'reasonable ac-
commodation."') (footnote omitted).
18. See Larsen v. Kirkham, 499 F. Supp. 960, 966 (D. Utah 1980) ("[TIhe
duty to accommodate applies only to those employers who are prohibited from
religious discrimination."); Ferguson v. Kroger Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 773, 777 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (describing the "failure to make a reasonable
accommodation" to an employee's "religious needs" as a "special category of dis-
crimination ... which is not like any other prohibition in Title VII"); Frantz, su-
pra note 10, at 212 ("The employer's duty to reasonably accommodate an em-
ployee's beliefs only arises in a situation where religious discrimination is
involved."); Estella J. Schoen, Note, Does the ADA Make Exceptions in a Union-
ized Workplace? The Conflict Between the Reassignment Provision of the ADA
and Collectively Bargained Seniority Systems, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1391, 1417
(1998) (observing that "Title VII's reasonable accommodation requirement...
applies only to religion").
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). For the author's previous considera-
tion of the ADA's reasonable accommodation obligation, see Michael D. Moberly,
Letting Katz Out of the Bag: The Employer's Duty to Accommodate Perceived
Disabilities, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 603 (1998).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994). For a prior academic discussion of the Re-
habilitation Act's reasonable accommodation requirement, see Mark E. Martin,
Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (1980).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(c) (1999); see also
Thomas v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 n.5 (10th Cir.
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ability discrimination context.2
In some cases, employers must accommodate employees
who wish to proselytize in the workplace.2 For example,
Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Industries,4 a prominent
state court employment discrimination case, involved an
evangelical Christian who believed he had "a religious duty to
tell others, especially non-Christians, about God and sinful
conduct." 5 The person believed that this duty included initi-
ating conversations about religion, "preaching" and "wit-
nessing" that might be objectionable to his listeners,26 and,
2000) ("A claim of religious discrimination under Title VII is similar to a claim
under the ADA because, in both situations, the employer has an affirmative ob-
ligation to make a reasonable accommodation."); Williams v. City of Charlotte,
899 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 n.6 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (noting that "the reasonable ac-
commodation language of the ADA is substantially similar to that of Title VII").
For a scholarly comparison of the two obligations, see Alan D. Schuchman,
Note, The Holy and the Handicapped: An Examination of the Different Applica-
tions of the Reasonable-Accommodation Clauses in Title VII and the ADA, 73
IND. L.J. 745 (1998).
22. Disability discrimination is not covered by Title VII. See King v. Sea-
board Coast Line R.R. Co., 538 F.2d 581, 583 (4th Cir. 1976) ("Title VII is lim-
ited in application to discrimination in employment based on race, color, relig-
ion, sex or national origin; it does not cover other types of discrimination,
however unfair they may be."); Julian v. New York City Transit Auth., 857 F.
Supp. 242, 250 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Title VII does not prohibit discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.").
23. See MICHAEL WOLF ET AL., RELIGION IN THE WORKPLACE: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 61 (1998) (ob-
serving that "employers may not discriminate against employees who prosely-
tize in the workplace"); Kimball E. Gilmer & Jeffrey M. Anderson, Zero Toler-
ance for God?: Religious Expression in the Workplace After Ellerth and
Farragher, 42 How. L. REV. 327, 341 (1999) (noting that Title VII "requires em-
ployers to accommodate 'religious observance and practice,"' and "religious be-
lievers often consider proselytizing to be an 'observance or practice' of their re-
ligious convictions").
24. Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 903 P.2d 351 (Or. 1995). For a
previous academic discussion of Meltebeke, see Kari Sand, Note, Meltebeke v.
BOLL: The Oregon Supreme Court Adopts a Knowledge Standard for Religious
Harassment in the Workplace, 75 OR. L. REV. 1333 (1996).
25. Meltebeke, 903 P.2d at 353; see also Spratt v. County of Kent, 621
F.Supp. 594, 600 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (describing an employee whose "religious
beliefs ... compelled him to engage, to some extent, in evangelizing"). See gen-
erally Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status
of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 56 (1986) (ob-
serving that "proselytizing... go[es] to the essence of evangelical religion").
26. Meltebeke, 903 P.2d at 353. One commentator noted that "[miany mem-
bers of [religious] faiths believe, as a matter of conscience, that they must com-
municate religious truths to others, even if - in fact, perhaps precisely because
- those truths disturb and unsettle those who hear them." Berg, supra note 1,
at 964.
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when he deemed it appropriate, the denunciation of sin "by
telling others that they are sinners."
2 7
When an employee sincerely holds such a belief,28 the
employer may be required to accommodate it," even in the
face of opposition from other employees." This article ad-
dresses that obligation," with a particular focus on the poten-
tial conflict between an employee's right to proselytize12 and
the right of other employees to work in an environment free of
religious harassment."
27. Meltebeke, 903 P.2d at 353.
28. In order to prevail on a Title VII religious discrimination claim, the em-
ployee must hold "a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted
with an employment duty." Tiano v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679,
681 (9th Cir. 1998). "To be bona fide, a belief must be sincerely held and, within
the believer's own scheme of things, religious." McGinnis v. United States
Postal Serv., 512 F. Supp. 517, 519 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
29. The proselytizing individual in Meltebeke was actually the employer.
See Meltebeke, 903 P.2d at 353. One commentator noted that "[t]his situation
raises special considerations and issues that may ... change the [accommoda-
tion] analysis." Berg, supra note 1, at 961.
30. See Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Schs., 33 F.3d 679, 684 (6th Cir.
1994) (observing that "some non-believers find [proselytizing] deeply offensive");
Thomas v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 990 F. Supp. 81, 88 (D. Conn. 1998)
(describing an employee who "complained about [a coworker's] preaching");
Debbie N. Kaminer, When Religious Expression Creates a Hostile Work Envi-
ronment: The Challenge of Balancing Competing Fundamental Rights, 4 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 81, 110 (2001) ("Some lower courts even presume that
religious expression is usually unwelcome in the workplace and that religious
speakers should realize this fact.").
31. For more general discussions of the employer's duty to accommodate re-
ligious beliefs, see Frantz, supra note 10; Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Re-
ligion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title VII and Religious Freedom, 40
N.Y.U. SCH. L. REV. 719 (1996); Salley Brandes, Comment, Religious Discrimi-
nation in Employment - The Undoing of Title VII's Reasonable Accommodation
Standard, 44 BROOK. L. REV. 598 (1978).
32. The Supreme Court has observed that the "exercise of religion" pro-
tected from governmental interference by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments "often involves.., proselytizing." Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). Although that constitutional pro-
tection is not directly applicable in the private employment setting, see Brown v.
Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1995), the Court's observation is perti-
nent in Title VII cases because "the [Act's] religious accommodation provision
promotes the free exercise of religion." Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 476 F.
Supp. 1027, 1030 (D. Or. 1979), affd, 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981).
33. See WOLF, supra note 23, at 59 (referring to "the potential for conflict
when one employee decides to proselytize during work, notwithstanding objec-
tions by coworkers"); Kaminer, supra note 30, at 109 (discussing "the direct con-
flict between an employee's ... right to religious expression in the workplace
and the right of other employees to be free from religious harassment").
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The article begins with a discussion of the legislative his-
tory of Title VII's prohibition of religious discrimination, in-
cluding the 1972 statutory amendment that affirmed the em-
ployer's duty to accommodate religious beliefs and practices.35
The article then discusses the impact of the employer's obli-
gation to provide employees with a working environment free
from religious harassment on its duty to accommodate relig-
ious proselytizing.36
Ultimately, the article concludes that while the extent of
an employer's duty to accommodate in this situation is uncer-
tain,37 significant guidance can be drawn by analogizing re-
ligious proselytizing to union solicitation,38 another form of
statutorily protected speech on which there is considerably
more existing legal authority.39 Under this approach, employ-
ers generally could prohibit proselytizing during working
time, ° but absent demonstrable evidence of workplace disrup-
tion," would not be entitled to restrict this religious practice,
34. One commentator described this history as "deeply ambiguous." Russell
S. Post, Note, The Serpentine Wall and the Serpent's Tongue: Rethinking the Re-
ligious Harassment Debate, 83 VA. L. REV. 177, 181 (1997); cf. Am. Motors Corp.
v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 305 N.W.2d 62, 72-73 (Wis. 1981)
("In view of the lack of guidelines by specific legislation or meaningful debate,
the precise legislative intent of congress [sic] in terms of implementation of re-
ligious freedom by the control of employment practices is vague indeed.").
35. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §
2(7), 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994)).
36. See generally Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 15 at 595 ("It... is not clear
how religious accommodation law might interplay with issues of religious har-
assment and religious employees.").
37. One commentator has noted that existing case law dealing with "the
special problems associated with workplace proselytization" is limited. Josh
Shopf, Religious Activity and Proselytization in the Workplace: The Murky Line
Between Healthy Expression and Unlawful Harassment, 31 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 39, 40 (1997).
38. See Webco Indus., Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 172, 186 n.10 (1998) (finding "un-
ion organizational solicitation ... to be akin to proselytizing"), enforced, 217
F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2000); cf. Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 415 F.2d 1077,
1095 (8th Cir. 1969) (Lay, J., dissenting) (criticizing an attempt to distinguish
"union solicitation ... from other forms of [protected] speech").
39. See generally Riesbeck Food Mkts., Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 940, 941 (1994)
(referring to the "well-established precedent" governing union solicitation);
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1428 & n.7 (1976) (referring to the
"settled authority" establishing the permissible employer limitations on work-
place union solicitation).
40. Cf. Sandusky Mall Co., 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1191, 1201 (1999) (Hurtgen,
dissenting) (relying "by way of analogy, [on] the long-established rule confining
employee union solicitation to nonwork hours").
41. The disruption could, but need not, take the form of potentially action-
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even on company premises, during an employee's nonworking
time.42
II. THE HISTORY OF TITLE VI'S PROHIBITION OF RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION
Title VII was enacted in 1964 as one component of com-
prehensive civil rights legislation 43 aimed primarily at elimi-
nating racial discrimination in various aspects of society, 44 in-
cluding voting, education and public accommodations.45 In
fact, as originally proposed, the employment discrimination
prohibitions contained in Title VII4 were directed solely at
race discrimination.47 Nevertheless, religion was also ulti-
able harassment of other employees. Compare Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire
Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1439 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (observing that "harassment...
may interfere with the regular operation of the [employer's business]"), with
Garrett v. Mobil Oil Corp., 531 F.2d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 1976) ("Actions which are
neither illegal nor physically damaging to persons and property may be disrup-
tive .... ).
42. See generally Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1437 (stating that "an employee's
right to freedom of expression is entitled to a great degree of weight when the
speech occurs during the employee's free hours") (citing Flanagan v. Munger,
890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989) and Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir.
1985)).
43. See Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Title VII
was enacted in 1964, as part of omnibus legislation .... ."); Grigoletti v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 570 A.2d 903, 908 (N.J. 1990) ("Title VII was enacted as part of
the comprehensive Civil Rights Act of 1964.").
44. See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420, 429 (N.D. Tex.
1979) ("The Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which Title VII is a part, was the first
comprehensive legislation ever to address the pervasive problem of discrimina-
tion against minorities - primarily blacks - in American society."); Warshafsky
v. Journal Co., 216 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Wis. 1974) ("The Civil Rights Act of 1964
arose out of the widespread public indignation of the invidious discrimination
suffered by racial minorities in America.").
45. See Warshafsky, 216 N.W.2d at 204; see also Robert Jerome Glennon,
The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 869,
932 (1994) ("Through the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, the [civil rights] movement secured prohibitions on dis-
crimination in employment, public accommodations, voting, housing, and educa-
tion.") (footnote omitted).
46. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F. Supp. 977, 979(W.D.N.Y. 1970) (indicating that "the equal employment provisions.., of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964" are contained in Title VII); cf. Pettus v. Veterans
Admin. Hosp. Phila., 517 F. Supp. 656, 658 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (noting that "Title
VII is limited in scope to employment discrimination").
47. See Grigoletti, 570 A.2d at 908 ("As originally introduced, the Civil
Rights Act applied exclusively to racial discrimination .... "); Patricia A. Cain,
The Future of Feminist Legal Theory, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 367, 373 (1997) ("As
originally introduced, Title VII barred only race discrimination in employ-
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mately (if somewhat mysteriously)48 included as a protected
Title VII class,49 although perhaps as "more [ofil an after-
thought than an imperative of public policy."" In any event,
the Act undisputedly "has, from its enactment, prohibited dis-
crimination against an individual with respect to his condi-
tions of employment because of such individual's religion."51
However, prior to 1972, there was no explicit statutory
requirement that employers accommodate the religious prac-
tices of their employees." Without defining the term "relig-
ment."); cf. Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 10, at 602 (referring to "the addition
of religious discrimination as an unlawful employment practice under title VII")
(emphasis added).
48. One commentator noted that Title VII's legislative history "contains no
explanation or debate concerning the inclusion of religion as a protected class
under the statute." Post, supra note 34, at 180 n.10; see also Edwards & Kap-
lan, supra note 10, at 602 (stating that religious discrimination received "scant
legislative consideration" in the debates that led to the enactment of Title VII);
Frantz, supra note 10, at 234 n.142 (referring to the "lack of congressional con-
cern over religious discrimination when the Act was being drafted").
49. See Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621, 623 (8th Cir. 1972) (ob-
serving that "Title VII extends outside the area of racial discrimination and
proscribes as well discrimination based on religion"); Dunning v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
892 F. Supp. 1424, 1427 (M.D. Ala. 1995) ("Title VII prohibits not only race
but ... religious discrimination."); Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 1299, 1305
(E.D. Pa. 1974) ("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 included ... relig-
ion... as [a] forbidden area[] of discrimination.") (citation omitted), vacated on
other grounds, 422 U.S. 1050 (1975).
50. Post, supra note 34, at 181. Commentators have suggested that Title
VII's prohibition of discrimination on the bases of both religion and national
origin (for which there is also relatively little legislative history, see Espinoza v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973)) reflects Congress's adoption of "boi-
lerplate" language contained in earlier nondiscrimination laws. Compare Juan
F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Discrimina-
tion Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 807 (1994) ("The national
origin term ended up in Title VII because it was part of the 'boilerplate' statu-
tory language of fair employment in executive orders and legislation preceding
the Civil Rights Act of 1964."), with Post, supra note 34, at 181:
[The] pervasive [legislative] silence suggests that religion was included
in Title VII as boilerplate language to ensure uniformity of the antidis-
crimination principle, not as a function of any compelling policy ration-
ale. This inference is supported by the fact that the earliest antece-
dents of Title VII, New Deal employment measures, often included
prohibitions against discrimination on account of "race, color, or creed,"
offering easy templates for the drafters of Title VII to adopt verbatim.
(footnotes omitted).
51. Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (E.D. Va. 1984); see also
Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 318, 333 (1987) (observing that "Title VII ... originally included
religion among the unlawful grounds for decision making").
52. See Yott v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1974);
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ion,"" Title VII instead merely purported to prohibit religious
discrimination to the same extent it prohibits discrimination
against other statutorily protected classes.54 One set of com-
mentators summarized this situation as follows: "As origi-
nally enacted, Title VII imposed a nondiscrimination obliga-
tion with respect to religion, but the duty to accommodate
was not reflected in the statute.""
The federal agency charged with primary responsibility
for enforcing Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission"),56 first suggested the
Act's reasonable accommodation requirement." Specifically,
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 331 n.1 (6th Cir. 1970), affd by an
equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
53. See Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp.
782, 784 (S.D. Cal. 1980) ("Religion was not defined in [the original] enact-
ment."), rev'd on other grounds, 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1981); Posey v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R. Co., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) j 7550, at 4727 (N.D. Ala.
1977) ("The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not define religion or religious discrimi-
nation until 1972 .... ).
54. See EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir.
1988) ("As originally enacted, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 simply
prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of religion."); Smith v. Pyro
Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1087 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Title VII, as enacted in 1964,
prohibited religious discrimination in employment, but went no further."); Ka-
miner, supra note 30, at 87 ("As originally passed, with regard to prohibitions
on employment discrimination, Title VII treated religion the same as race, color,
sex or national origin.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 224 (3d ed. 1996). Nor did the Act's original legislative
history indicate that there was a statutory duty to accommodate. For example,
the witnesses appearing before the Education and Labor Committee
dealt only with the easy cases of alleged religious discrimination - i.e.,
willful discriminatory hiring and promotion practices - and then
mostly with respect to discrimination against Jews. No testimony was
given concerning the less well-known religions such as Seventh Day
Adventism, and the discussion of religious discrimination was not
broadened to include problems such as work assignments that conflict
with religious holidays.
Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 10, at 602 n.10.
56. See McIntyre-Handy v. West Telemktg. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 718, 725(E.D. Va. 2000) ("In addition to creating the substantive rights set forth in Title
VII, Congress empowered the EEOC to enforce Title VII by acting on individual
complaints."); Chacon v. Ochs, 780 F. Supp. 680, 682 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (observing
that "the EEOC... is charged by Congress with the duty of interpreting, ad-
ministering, and enforcing Title VII").
57. See Smith, 827 F.2d at 1087 ("The question of the necessity for accom-
modation was left to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission."); Weit-
kenaut v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (D. Vt. 1974)("The employer's duty of reasonable accommodation... [is] derived from [an
agency] guideline.").
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the Commission included the requirement in interpretative
guidelines issued two years after the Act was adopted,58 and
again in modified guidelines issued the following year. 9 One
jurist observed that the "cornerstone" of these EEOC guide-
lines was the employer's obligation to accommodate the re-
ligious needs of its employees if the accommodation could be
made without undue hardship on the conduct of its business. 9
Although issuing such interpretive guidelines falls within
the Commission's statutory mandate,61 its interpretation of
58. See Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996) (ob-
serving that the reasonable accommodation obligation "[ilnitially... emerged
within 1966 EEOC guidelines interpreting Title VII"); Hiatt v. Walker Chevro-
let Co., 837 P.2d 618, 621 (Wash. 1992) ("Shortly after the federal statute was
enacted, the [EEOC] interpreted [Title VIII to impose a duty on the part of em-
ployers to accommodate the religious practices and beliefs of employees."). As
one federal appellate judge explained,
[tihe initial guidelines issued in 1966 by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) interpreted the Act's prohibition against
discrimination on religious grounds as imposing a duty on employers to
accommodate the "reasonable religious needs of employees and, in
some cases, prospective employees where such accommodations can be
made without serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business."
Cooper v. Gen. Dynamics, Convair Aerospace Div., 533 F.2d 163, 174 (5th Cir.
1976) (Rives, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
1605.1(a)(2) (1966)) (footnote omitted), reh'g denied, 537 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir.
1977).
59. See Cooper, 533 F.2d at 174 (Rives, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("In 1967 the EEOC adopted new guidelines reinterpreting the em-
ployer's duty not to engage in religious discrimination. These new regula-
tions... included a provision placing on the employer the burden of proving
that an undue hardship renders the required accommodations to the religious
needs of the employees unreasonable.") (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(c) (1967)).
60. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 1970)
(Combs, J., dissenting), affd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
But see id. at 336 (asserting that "[u]nder the [original guidelines] .... the em-
ployer was under no obligation to accommodate").
61. See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Hernandez, 264 F. Supp. 227, 228 & n.3
(D.D.C. 1967) ("The Act ... provide[s] that the Commission [can], within its own
discretion, issue written interpretations or opinions .... ) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-12(b) (1994)). As one court has stated,
Congress intended that the Commission should have the authority to
issue and publicize its interpretations of the meaning of the provisions
of Title VII. The promulgation of interpretive guidelines is a necessary
function of an agency which is entrusted with the duty of administering
a statute. In the case of a statute such as Title VII, where emphasis is
placed on voluntary compliance with the requirements of non-
discrimination,... the promulgation of reasonable interpretive guide-
lines has the salutary effect of informing the public of the Commission's
interpretation of the statute.
Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (D.D.C.
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Title VII's prohibition of religious discrimination to include a
reasonable accommodation requirement was not universally
embraced,62 and did not have the force of law.63 Nevertheless,
that interpretation was ultimately incorporated into the Act
in 1972,64 when Congress amended Title VII in response to
the Supreme Court's affirmance of the Sixth Circuit's contro-
versial decision in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co. 61
The plaintiff in Dewey was discharged for failing to per-
form overtime work on Sundays as required by the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement." He claimed that such work
would violate his religious beliefs, 7 and that his right to con-
tinued employment while following his religious beliefs was
1968). For an academic discussion of this issue, see Rebecca Hanner White, The
EEOC, The Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the
Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51 (1995).
62. See, e.g., Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d 346, 348-49 (6th Cir.
1972) (quoting lower court's conclusion that there is "no duty on the part of an
employer to accommodate an employee's or potential employee's religious be-
lief'); Dawson v. Mizell, 325 F. Supp. 511, 514 (E.D. Va. 1971) ("Religious dis-
crimination should not be equated with failure to accommodate.").
63. See Dewey, 429 F.2d at 332-33 (Combs, J., dissenting); Riley v. Bendix
Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583, 588 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.
1972). See generally Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 n.6(1986) ("EEOC guidelines are properly accorded less weight than administrative
regulations declared by Congress to have the force of law.") (referring to Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 139-40 (1944)); Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th
Cir. 1971) ("EEOC guidelines ... do not have the force of law .... ") (referring to
Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 1100 (D.D.C.
1969)). For an academic discussion of this issue, see John S. Moot, Comment,
An Analysis of Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretative Guidelines, 1 ADMIN.
L.J. 213 (1987).
64. See Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1087-88 (6th Cir. 1987)("[Wihen Congress amended Title VII in 1972, it added the reasonable accom-
modation requirement, thereby explicitly adopting the EEOC's interpretation of
Title VII."); Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights v. Gen. Motors Corp., 317 N.W.2d 16, 20(Mich. 1982) (observing that "the duty first enunciated in 1967 by the EEOC
subsequently [was] enacted in 1972 into Title VII").
65. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affd by an
equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). Dewey has been described as "the
first key case concerning the employer's duty to accommodate." Frantz, supra
note 10, at 214; see also Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights, 317 N.W.2d at 24 (stating
that Dewey was the "first major case to face this issue").
66. Dewey, 429 F.2d at 327-28, 329. Absent evidence of pretext or the exis-
tence of an affirmative duty to accommodate, "refusing to ... work overtime" is
a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a firing." EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood
& McQueen, 758 F. Supp. 1440, 1452 (W.D. Okla. 1991), affd, 956 F.2d 944
(10th Cir. 1992).
67. See Dewey, 429 F.2d at 328, 329.
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absolute.68 The Sixth Circuit held that there had been no dis-
crimination on the basis of the plaintiffs religion6 9 within the
meaning of Title VII,7' because all of the company's employees
had been treated similarly with respect to overtime schedul-
ing.
71
However, this conclusion did not end the court's inquiry,
because under the EEOC's interpretive guidelines an em-
ployee claiming that his employer failed to accommodate his
religious beliefs could prevail even if other employees had not
been treated more favorably. 3 With respect to that issue, the
Dewey court concluded that even if the EEOC's interpretation
of Title VII were correct,74 the employer offered the plaintiff a
reasonable accommodation7" by instituting a system whereby
68. See id. at 327. See generally Mathewson v. Fla. Game & Fresh Water
Fish Comm'n, 693 F. Supp. 1044, 1050 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that an em-
ployer has "an obligation to reasonably accommodate employees who, because of
their specific beliefs and practices, refuse to work on particular days of the
week"), affd, 871 F.2d 123 (11th Cir. 1989).
69. See Dewey, 429 F.2d at 329 ("We find nothing discriminatory in the pro-
visions of the collective bargaining agreement or in the manner in which [the
employer] executed it. In our opinion, it provided a fair and equitable method of
distributing the heavy workload among the employees without discrimination
against any of them.").
70. The court stated that "[tihe legislative history of [Title VIII is clear that
it was aimed only at discriminating practices." Id. at 328 (referring to 110
CONG. REC. 13079-80 (1964)).
71. See id. ("Reference to the collective bargaining agreement indicates
rather clearly that the provisions with respect to ... overtime work apply to all
employees equally and do not discriminate against [the plaintiff] or any other
employee.").
72. See Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1362 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (noting that the employer's articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions "does not end the Court's analysis" where the plaintiff "is
proceeding under the accommodation theory"); Drazewski v. Waukegan Dev.
Ctr., 651 F. Supp. 754, 759 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("In the context of religious beliefs, it
is not enough that an employer has adopted certain practices which are facially
neutral.").
73. See Hellinger, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 1362; Breech v. Alabama Power Co., 962
F. Supp. 1447, 1459 n.15 (S.D. Ala. 1997), affd, 140 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 1998);
cf. Berg, supra note 1, at 977 ("An employer might be held liable under Title VII
for prohibiting an employee's religious practice even pursuant to a neutral,
across-the-board work rule.").
74. In its initial decision, the court did not specifically reach this issue, but
stated that "[t]he authority of [the] EEOC to adopt a regulation interfering with
the internal affairs of an employer, absent discrimination, may well be
doubted." Dewey, 429 F.2d at 331 n.1; cf. Frantz, supra note 10, at 208 (stating
that "the court in Dewey... questioned the validity and binding effect of these
regulations on the courts").
75. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 331 (6th Cir. 1970),
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an employee could find a replacement to work objectionable or
inconvenient hours.76 The court reasoned that accommodat-
ing the plaintiffs request that the employer instead find his
replacement77 could have resulted in unlawful discrimination
against other employees "by requiring them to work on Sun-
days in the [plaintiffs] place."78
This aspect of Dewey has since been rejected by the
EEOC, 9 and was effectively overruled by the Sixth Circuit it-
self in Smith v. Pyro Mining Co.8" However, the Dewey court
also made the following observation that, although dictum,8'
("[Elven if the [EEOC] regulations are applied, we think that [the employer]
complied.., by making a reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of
its employees when it permitted [the plaintifil, by [a] replacement system, to
observe Sunday as his Sabbath.").
76. See id. at 329 (noting that the employer had "issued an interpretation
[of the collective bargaining agreement] that any employee assigned to overtime
could be relieved from the assignment simply by arranging for another qualified
employee to replace him"); see also Breech v. Alabama Power Co., 962 F. Supp.
1447, 1460 (S.D. Ala. 1997) ("Employer authorizations of... voluntary shift
swaps constitute reasonable accommodations under Title VII.") (citing Beadle v.
Hillsborough County Sheriffs Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 593 (11th Cir. 1994)), affd,
140 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 1998).
77. See Dewey, 429 F.2d at 330; cf. Claybaugh v. Pac. Northwest Bell Tel.
Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Or. 1973) ("The burden is on the employer and not the
employee asking for an accommodation to seek out the cooperation of other em-
ployees if... this would be a reasonable accommodation.").
78. Dewey, 429 F.2d at 330; cf. Kaminer, supra note 30, at 97 (observing
that "employers are not required to violate valid statutes in accommodating a
religious employee"). A dissenting judge maintained that the employer's re-
placement system was "no solution" to the plaintiffs problem, because his re-
fusal to find his own replacement "was grounded in his belief that working on
Sunday is inherently wrong and that it would be a sin for him to induce another
to work in his place." Dewey, 429 F.2d at 333 (Combs, J., dissenting).
79. The Commission's "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion"
contain the following discussion of this issue:
Reasonable accommodation without undue hardship is generally possi-
ble where a voluntary substitute with substantially similar qualifica-
tions is available. One means of substitution is the voluntary swap. In
a number of cases, the securing of a substitute has been left entirely up
to the individual seeking the accommodation. The Commission be-
lieves that the obligation to accommodate requires that employers ...
facilitate the securing of a voluntary substitute with substantially
similar qualifications.
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)(i)
(1999).
80. 827 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1987); cf. Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel
Corp., 397 F. Supp. 375, 377 (W.D. Pa. 1975) ("Just' because... Sabbath obser-
vance by one employee forces other employees to substitute during the weekend
hours does not demonstrate an undue hardship on the employer's business.").
81. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73 n.8 (1977)
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ultimately had even greater significance for Title VII juris-
prudence:
Nowhere in the legislative history of the Act do we find
any Congressional intent to coerce or compel one person to
accede to or accommodate the religious beliefs of another.
The requirement of accommodation to religious beliefs is
contained only in the EEOC Regulations, which in our
82judgment are not consistent with the Act.
The Dewey court's controversial rejection of the EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII 83 was subsequently affirmed by an
equally divided Supreme Court.84 Another federal appellate
court asserted that this course of events "had the potential to
exclude all religious practices from coverage by Title VII."85
However, Congress promptly responded to the Dewey deci-
sion by adding a definition of "religion" to Title VII8 that
("[T]he employer in Dewey was not excused from a duty to accommodate; the
Court of Appeals simply held that the employer had satisfied any obligation
that it might have had under the statute.").
82. Dewey, 429 F.2d at 334; see also Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F.
Supp. 892, 895 (E.D. Ark. 1972) ("The EEOC regulation imposing a duty to...
accommodate unless there is an undue hardship on the employer goes beyond
the Congressional mandate .... "). See generally Mungen v. Choctaw, Inc., 402
F. Supp. 1349, 1352 (W.D. Tenn. 1975) ("While E.E.O.C. has the authority to
promulgate regulations to carry out Title VII, it cannot subvert the meaning of
the Statute by its implementation of those regulations."); White, supra note 61,
at 93 ("The EEOC is without power to impose new duties or obligations not
found in Title VII.").
83. See Smith, 827 F.2d at 1093 (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (noting that
"the Dewey decision attracted widespread legal notoriety subsequent to its pub-
lication," and that the Sixth Circuit's rejection of the EEOC's interpretation of
Title VII "stimulate[d] debate among legal commentators and the judiciary"); cf.
Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights v. Gen. Motors Corp., 317 N.W.2d 16, 24 (Mich. 1982)
(noting that "the original opinion of the Sixth Circuit panel is of doubtful prece-
dential value due, in part, to its variety of rationales").
84. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971). Justice Harlan did
not participate in the Dewey case. See Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair
Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp. 782, 785 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1981); Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F.
Supp. 892, 894 n.1 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
85. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 613 n.4 (9th Cir.
1988). But see Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights, 317 N.W.2d at 24 (asserting that "the
affirmance by an equally divided Supreme Court entitles Dewey to no preceden-
tial weight"); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1972) ("The
Supreme Court affirmed the Dewey case by an equally divided court. Of course,
this added nothing to the jurisprudence.") (citation omitted).
86. See Townley Eng'g, 859 F.2d at 613 n.4 ("The amendment was in direct
response to the decision in Dewey.") (citation omitted); Cooper v. Gen. Dynam-
ics, Convair Aerospace Div., 533 F.2d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting that Con-
gress was "[aicting in what can only be viewed as a direct response to the Sixth
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specifically extended the Act's protection to employees and
applicants in connection with "all aspects of religious obser-
vance and practice,"88 unless the observance or practice at is-
sue could not be accommodated "without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer's business. 89
Several courts have asserted that this amendment con-
firmed the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII as reflected in
its religious discrimination guidelines. 90 On the other hand,
at least one court has stated that the amendment "cannot be
relied on to establish a Congressional intent with respect to
the [original] statute, which was not expressed in that stat-
ute."9'
In either event, the amendment resulted in the imposi-
tion of an affirmative obligation on the employer to accommo-
date an employee or applicant's religious practice9" unless it
Circuit's expressed doubts in Dewey about the EEOC's power to adopt such
regulations as its revised guidelines"), reh'g denied, 537 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir.
1977); Riley, 464 F.2d at 1116 (observing that the amendment "was designed to
resolve the issue left open by the equal division of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Dewey").
87. See Bruton v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 623 F. Supp. 939, 940 n.1 (D. Del.
1985) ("In 1972, Title VII was amended to add a definition of religion which ex-
pounds on employers' duties with respect to employees' religious beliefs.").
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994); see also Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 950
(3d Cir. 1991) (noting that the definitional amendment "broaden[ed] the prohi-
bition against discrimination ... so that religious practice as well as religious
belief and affiliation would be protected").
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). For a recent academic discussion of the "undue
hardship" exception to the employer's duty to accommodate, see Polly Hayes,
Note, Thou Shalt Not Discriminate: The Application of Title VII's Undue Hard-
ship Standard in Balint v. Carson City, 45 VILL. L. REV. 289 (2000).
90. See Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights, 317 N.W.2d at 25 ("IT]he passage of the
amendment.., was hailed.., as having laid to rest any doubts as to the effect
of the EEOC guidelines. Indeed, the 1972 amendment was characterized as
having validated or affirmed the guideline's interpretation of Title VII's ban on
religious discrimination.") (citations omitted); Weitkenaut v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (D. Vt. 1974) (concluding that "the 1972
definition of 'religion' is declarative of Congress' intent in 1964").
91. Reid v. Memphis Publ'g Co., 521 F.2d 512, 520 (6th Cir. 1975), reh'g de-
nied, 525 F.2d 986 (6th Cir. 1976); cf. Am. Motors Corp. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor
& Human Relations, 305 N.W.2d 62, 74 (Wis. 1981) ("[T]he federal courts had
great difficulty in concluding that the 1967 EEOC guidelines interpreting the
federal law constituted a cognizable declaration of the legislative intent of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.").
92. See Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights, 317 N.W.2d at 22-24; see also Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists v. Boeing Co., 833 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The 1972
amendment requires employers to take reasonable steps to accommodate their
employees' religious beliefs."); Wangsness v. Watertown Sch. Dist. No. 14-4, 541
F. Supp. 332, 335 (D.S.D. 1982) ("An employer's obligation to reasonably ac-
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cannot do so without undue hardship on its business.93 It is
primarily this aspect of Title VII that exposes employers to
potential liability for limiting or prohibiting workplace relig-
ious proselytizing. 4 Indeed, absent the statutory duty to ac-
commodate reflected in the 1972 amendment, an employer's
potential liability for religious harassment under Title VII"
might create a compelling incentive for restricting religious
speech in the workplace.96
III. THE EMPLOYER'S POTENTIAL LIABILITY TO OTHER
EMPLOYEES FOR PERMITTING WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS
PROSELYTIZING
The Supreme Court has held that the scope of Title VII is
not limited to "tangible" or "economic" discrimination.97 The
Act also prohibits noneconomic workplace discrimination or
harassment based upon an individual's religious beliefs99 or
lack of religious beliefs.9 Under this interpretation of the
commodate the religious beliefs of its employees is derived from [the] 1972
amendment to Title VII .... ).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 992 F.2d
1033, 1037 (10th Cir. 1993).
94. See Berg, supra note 1, at 977 (suggesting that "any broad restriction of
employees' religious speech ... [clould collide with the duty to accommodate");
Kaminer, supra note 30, at 102 n.121 ("[A] broad ban on religious expression in
the workplace by a private employer would arguably violate [Title VII's] re-
quirement of reasonable accommodation.").
95. See infra notes 97-163 and accompanying text.
96. See Berg, supra note 1, at 982. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Free-
dom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harass-
ment, 75 TEx. L. REV. 687, 698-99 (1997) ("Current harassment law... pushes
liability-conscious employers in the direction of censorship ....").
97. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986); see also Rodriguez
v. Bd. of Educ., 620 F.2d 362, 366 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Congress did not intend to
confine the scope of Title VII simply to instances of discrimination in pecuniary
emoluments.").
98. See Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 975 (7th Cir. 1997); see also
Weiss v. Ren Labs., 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 73, 80 (S.D. Fla. 1999)
(noting that an employer has "a legal duty to keep its workplace free of religious
harassment"); Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Iowa 1990)
(holding that "a hostile work environment based on religious harassment is a
form of religious discrimination"); EEOC Dec. No. 76-98, 1976 EEOC LEXIS 8,
at **9-10 (Feb. 26, 1976) (stating that an employer "engage[s] in unlawful em-
ployment practices in violation of Title VII... by harassing [an employee] be-
cause of his religion").
99. See Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 544, 551 (W.D. Mich.
1994) ("The fact that [an individual's] disagreement on religious issues with her
employer is not premised on a faith of her own does not preclude her suit.")
(footnote omitted), affd in part and rev'd in part, 85 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1996);
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Act, workplace religious proselytizing could be actionable un-
der Title VII in certain circumstances as demonstrated be-
low.
100
A. The Employer's Potential Liability for Proselytizing by
Supervisors
The prospect of employer liability for religious prosely-
tizing is particularly significant where a supervisor engages
in the conduct 01 because the employer in that situation is
more likely to appear to be imposing its own religious views
on its employees.' As one federal appellate court has stated:
"Protecting an employee's right to be free from forced obser-
vance of the religion of his employer is at the heart of Title
VII's prohibition against religious discrimination."' °
This is hardly a new concept.04 As early as 1972,10 the
EEOC applied this reasoning to conclude that an employer
violated Title VII by permitting a supervisor to "preach relig-
Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (D. Or. 1979) (noting
that Title VII is a "neutral provision" protecting "believer or atheist"), afftd, 648
F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981). See generally Streeter v. Brogan, 274 A.2d 312, 315
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971) (discussing the contention that "[a] statute
against [religious] discrimination ... should protect an atheist as well as a
member of a religious faith").
100. See Brown v. Polk County, 832 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (S.D. Iowa 1993)
(observing that "religious activity may lend itself to the type of conduct prohib-
ited by... laws forbidding religious harassment"), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995); Estlund, supra note 96, at 697 ("In some cases,
professions of religious belief and religious proselytizing have contributed to
findings of religious harassment."). But see Schopf, supra note 37, at 45
("[Wihether proselytization is considered to create a hostile work environment is
not clear.").
101. See generally Schopf, supra note 37, at 44 (describing "attempts by...
supervisors to bring a religious element into the workplace in a potentially of-
fensive manner" as a "type[] of religious harassment").
102. See Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1021 (4th Cir.
1996). See generally Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 15, at 615 ("Courts have...
found a religious hostile environment in cases where the employer used the
workplace to engage in religious discussion, proclamation, or proselytization.").
103. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 620-21 (9th Cir.
1988); see also Terry Morehead Dworkin & Ellen R. Peirce, Is Religious Har-
assment "More Equal?", 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 44, 86 (1995) ("Abuse of
power ... lies at the heart of harassment theory.").
104. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 55, at 247 ("Harassment
based on religion is not a new issue, and lower courts have long recognized a
cause of action under Title VII to redress it.") (footnotes omitted).
105. One commentator has described the EEOC's 1972 decision as "the earli-
est religious harassment decision." Post, supra note 34, at 183 n.23.
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ion while on the job."0 6 Relying on a prior Commission deci-
sion"7 holding that "Title VII obligates an employer to main-
tain a working atmosphere free of intimidation based upon
race, color, religion, sex or national origin,"0 8 the EEOC ex-
plained that because a supervisor's religious proselytizing has
the potential to intimidate other employees,' 9 it may consti-
tute unlawful religious harassment.1
Although the analysis in the EEOC's 1972 religious har-
assment decision has been criticized,"' several courts have
since reached the same conclusion."2 In Turic v. Holland
Hospitality, Inc.,"3 for example, a federal district court cited
the EEOC decision with apparent approval for the proposition
that a supervisor who discusses his or her religious convic-
tions in the workplace violates Title VII's requirement that
the employer provide a working environment free from relig-
106. EEOC Dec. No. 72-1114, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 842, 842 (Feb.
18, 1972).
107. No court appears to have recognized a religious harassment claim until
1976, when the court in Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-61
(S.D. Ohio 1976) held that an employer may be liable under Title VII "[w]hen a
person vested with managerial responsibilities embarks upon a course of con-
duct calculated to demean an employee before his fellows because of the em-
ployee's professed religious views." See Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 15, at 584
n.45 ("The Court in Compston was the first to recognize a religious harassment
claim."); Dworkin & Pierce, supra note 103, at 78 (describing Compston as "the
first case to recognize religious harassment").
108. EEOC Dec. No. 72-1114, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 842, 843 (citing
EEOC Dec. No. 71-2344, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1255 (June 3, 1971)).
109. For example, the Commission described one employee who "believed
that his job security could be affected by his reaction to the religion oriented
statements by his supervisor." Id.
110. See id. The Commission added: "Clearly, an employer is responsible for
the actions of its supervisors." Id.
111. See Post, supra note 34, at 182 (asserting that the EEOC "articulated no
analytical framework" for resolving the type of religious harassment claim it
was recognizing).
112. However, "the courts are not bound by the EEOC's interpretation of Ti-
tle VII." Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 750 (4th Cir. 1996); see
also Reeb v. Econ. Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 n.5 (5th Cir.
1975) ("Although we do not regard [an] individual decision of the EEOC as dis-
positive, we do regard it as a useful and persuasive guide."); Hicks v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 49 F.R.D. 184, 191 (E.D. La. 1968) (observing that an "inter-
pretation of [Title VIII by the Commission is not conclusive"). But cf. Air
Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Hernandez, 264 F. Supp. 227, 229 (D.D.C. 1967) (noting
that "the Commission's interpretative rulings ... have the effect of law").
113. Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Mich. 1994),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 85 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1996).
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ious intimidation.1 1 4
Additionally, in Kallas v. Department of Motor Vehicles,"5
a state court likewise cited the EEOC's decision for the propo-
sition that "an employer violate [s] Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act by allowing a supervisor to propound his religious beliefs
while on the job.""6 Like the Turic court,"7 the court in Kallas
indicated that permitting a supervisor to engage in religious
proselytizing may result in a finding that the employer failed
to provide its employees with a working environment free
from religious intimidation."8
These are not the only courts that have cited the EEOC's
seminal 1972 religious harassment decision with approval," 9
and several commentators have also noted the significance of
the Commission's decision." ° In addition, other courts have
reached similar results without specifically relying upon the
EEOC's view of the issue."1
For example, in Brown Transport Co. v. Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission,"2 the court held that a Jewish
employee had been subjected to unlawful religious harass-
ment'13 as the result of his employer's occasional inclusion of
religious articles in an employee newsletter."4 The court re-
114. See id. at 551.
115. Kallas v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 560 P.2d 709 (Wash. 1977).
116. Id. at 711.
117. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
118. See Kallas, 560 P.2d at 711.
119. See, e.g., Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 146-
47 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975) (Thornberry, J., dissenting); Weiss v. Ren Labs. of Fla., 81
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 73, 81 (S.D. Fla. 1999). But see Rosen v. Baker,
No. CV-88-1969, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22234, at *18 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. May 1,
1995) (asserting that "[tihis EEOC Decision has not generally been picked up by
the courts").
120. See, e.g., Post, supra note 34, at 182, 193 n.72 (describing the decision as
"pioneering" and "seminal"); see also LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 55,
at 223 n.26 (citing the decision for the proposition that "a supervisor cannot
subject subordinates to his preaching").
121. See generally EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
353, 354 (S.D. Tex. 1981) ("It is the federal courts, not the EEOC, which holds
final enforcement responsibility under Title VII.").
122. Brown Transp. Co. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 578 A.2d 555 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990). For a prior academic discussion of Brown Transport, see
Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 15, at 615-16.
123. In one respect this is a common scenario. One pair of commentators has
asserted that in "all successful federal religious harassment decisions through
1994... the individuals were harassed because they were Jewish." Dworkin &
Pierce, supra note 103, at 78.
124. See Brown Transport, 578 A.2d at 557-59.
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lied upon evidence indicating that the religious material con-
tained in the newsletter caused the plaintiff to question his
job security,2 ' and led him to conclude that an employee
needed to be a Christian in order to advance in the com-
126
pany.
Although one commentator has described Brown Trans-
port as a "frightening" example of a court suppressing pro-
tected religious expression in the name of shielding employ-
ees from religious harassment, 127 the Seventh Circuit reached
a similar result in Venters v. City of Delphi .128 The plaintiff in
Venters claimed to have been subjected to repeated lectures
from her supervisor expressing his views of appropriate
Christian behavior,'29 to admonitions that she needed to be
"saved" in order to avoid damnation,' and to inappropriate
inquiries into her religious and social life.' She ultimately
brought a Title VII claim against her employer'3 2 alleging,
among other things,'33 that the supervisor's conduct created
125. See id. at 562. The content of the objectionable articles was not specified
in the court's opinion, but a previous commentator stated that "[aipparently, the
message of the articles was a Christian one, not an anti-Jewish one." Kingsley
R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the
First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 491 n.59 (1991).
126. See Brown Transport, 578 A.2d at 562. The employer's actual refusal to
promote the plaintiff because of his religious beliefs clearly would have violated
Title VII. See also Vitug v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 88 F.3d 506, 512-16 (7th
Cir. 1996); Thomas v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 990 F. Supp. 81, 88-89 (D.
Conn. 1998).
127. Wayne Lindsey Robbins, Jr., When Two Liberal Values Collide in an Era
of "Political Correctness": First Amendment Protection as a Check on Speech-
Based Title VII Hostile Environment Claims, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 789, 800
(1995); see also Kaminer, supra note 30, at 134 (noting that the Brown Trans-
port court provided "little explanation for its reasoning").
128. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1997). For a previous
discussion of Venters, see Eileen B. Goldsmith, Case Note, God's House, or the
Law's, 108 YALE L.J. 1433 (1999).
129. See Venters, 123 F.3d at 970. One pair of commentators has asserted
that "[most... new [religious] harassment cases involve proselytizing Chris-
tians." Dworkin & Pierce, supra note 103, at 78.
130. See Venters, 123 F.3d at 970. See generally Berg, supra note 1, at 987-88
("[Rieligious statements, especially dogmatic or proselytizing ones, often chal-
lenge and disturb listeners. The speaker may well assert that others are mis-
guided on the most important and significant matters in life and therefore are
headed for eternal damnation.").
131. See Venters, 123 F.3d at 970.
132. See id. at 961.
133. In addition to the religious harassment claim discussed here, the plain-
tiff in Venters asserted another Title VII claim alleging that she had been un-
lawfully discharged on the basis of her religion, and in particular "because she
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an intimidating and offensive working environment that al-
tered the conditions of her employment, and thus constituted
unlawful religious harassment."'
The trial court granted the employer's motion for sum-
mary judgment,3 ' and the plaintiff appealed.3 ' The Seventh
Circuit reversed, 7 holding that the plaintiff had submitted
sufficient evidence to permit her religious harassment claim
to proceed to trial.3 8 In reaching this conclusion, the court fo-
cused on the fact that a supervisor did the proselytizing,'39
which continued unabated even after the plaintiff made it
clear that the supervisor's conduct was unwelcome. 40
The court acknowledged the tension between the supervi-
sor's right to express his religious views' 4' and the plaintiffs
right "to be left alone to exercise her own thoughts on the
subject of religion in private.' 42 However, the court concluded
did not measure up to [her supervisor's] religious expectations." Id. at 972. The
Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence in sup-
port of this alternative theory of recovery to survive the employer's motion for
summary judgment. See Venters, 123 F.3d at 974, 977. See generally
LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 55, at 753 (observing that "harassment
cases often present discharge issues as well").
134. See Venters, 123 F.3d at 972.
135. See id. at 961.
136. See id. at 962, 971.
137. In addition to the matters discussed in the text, the trial court concluded
that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of religious discrimina-
tion "without informing her employer of her religious needs, and requesting that
those needs be accommodated," which she had not done. Id. at 971. However,
the appellate court disagreed, noting that the case was "not, at bottom, an ac-
commodation case." Id. at 971 n.5. See generally Beiner & DiPippa, supra note
15, at 583 (observing that "[a]ccommodation claims" are "theoretically different
than hostile environment claims").
138. See Venters, 123 F.3d at 977.
139. See id. ("[Plaintiffs] case ... does not rest on allegations of mere discom-
fort with religious views that we may assume [the supervisor] ... was free to
express, but upon allegations that [the supervisor] used his office to impose his
religious views on [the plaintiff! as his subordinate.").
140. See id. at 976.
141. The court here specifically referred to the supervisor's First Amendment
rights. See id. at 977. However, he also had a potential statutory right to
proselytize, since he believed the Bible compelled him to share his religious
views with others, see id., and Title VII requires the employer to accommodate
such a belief unless doing so would constitute an undue hardship. See generally
Kaminer, supra note 30, at 141 ("A supervisor's right to religious expression in
the workplace is protected by both Title VII and the Constitution.").
142. Venters, 123 F.3d at 977. See generally Gilmer & Anderson, supra note
23, at 327-28 (discussing the "uniquely significant tension" present in cases
where "one employee feels compelled to express her religious convictions in the
workplace, and others feel harassed by that very expression").
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that it was unnecessary to resolve the conflict on the facts
presented,"' because any rights the supervisor had did not in-
clude the right to make "highly personal remarks about the
status of [the plaintiffs] soul when informed that these re-
marks were unwelcome."'"
B. The Employer's Potential Liability for Proselytizing by
Coworkers
Although the employer's potential liability for religious
harassment is greatest when a supervisor is proselytizing,
141
its exposure is unlikely to be limited to that situation.
46
While there is relatively little case law on this issue,"17 the
EEOC has held that an employer may also be liable for relig-
ious harassment committed by nonsupervisory employees.1
48
There is little reason to believe this view would not extend to
cases involving unwelcome religious proselytizing.1
49
143. See Venters, 123 F.3d at 977 ("We are not called upon to draw lines at
this juncture.").
144. Id.; cf. Berg, supra note 1, at 985 ("[O]nce the recipient says that the
speech directed at her individually is unwelcome and asks that it stop, any sig-
nificant further speech can provide the basis for harassment liability.").
145. See Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 639-40 (Iowa 1990)
(Harris, J., dissenting in part) ("It is much more difficult [for the employer] to
escape [liability] ... when the discrimination is inflicted, not by just another
coworker, but by a supervisor whom the employer placed in charge of the victim
of discrimination."); cf. Kaminer, supra note 30, at 135 n.306 ("[T]here is an in-
creased risk of harassment when the religious speaker is a supervisor."); Berg,
supra note 1, at 987 ("Speech by a supervisor certainly is more likely to have an
effect on an employee's work environment, other things equal, than similar
speech by a co-worker.").
146. See Vaughn, 459 N.W.2d at 634 ("An employer cannot stand by and
permit an employee to be harassed by his coworkers."); Kaminer, supra note 30,
at 86 (observing that "Title VII prohibits hostile work environment harassment,
regardless of whether it is created by an employer or other employees").
147. See Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 15, at 615 n.238.
Although there is a good deal of discussion about the employer's poten-
tial liability when an employee engages in harassing religious conduct
on the job, we have found only one case where liability for a hostile en-
vironment was imposed. Employers and courts, however, assume that
the employer will be liable in such cases.
Id. (citations omitted).
148. See EEOC Dec. No. 83-1, 1982 EEOC LEXIS 8, at *9 n.3 (Oct. 7, 1982)
("The Commission has imposed ... liability on employers for the conduct of
their non-supervisory employees in numerous ... Commission decisions in-
volving harassment on the basis of sex, race, religion and national origin.")
(citing cases).
149. See generally Schopf, supra note 37, at 55 ("If... [a] co-worker attempts
to impose his religious beliefs on others and does so in a constant and pervasive
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Indeed, the applicable law in religious harassment cases
has evolved largely through the application of principles de-
veloped in sexual harassment cases,"' where employers
clearly can be held liable for the conduct of nonsupervisory
employees."' The analogy may be particularly appropriate in
cases involving religious proselytizing... because, unlike the
use of epithets and other, more typical forms of religious har-
assment,"' proselytizing is conceptually more similar to sex-
manner sufficient to create hostility, those targeted should not be forced to en-
dure the imposition without being able to take legal measures to end such ac-
tivity.").
150. The EEOC has specifically indicated that the principles applicable in
sexual harassment cases also apply in cases involving harassment on the basis
of "race, color, religion or national origin." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 n.1 (1999); See
Gilmer & Anderson, supra note 23, at 334 (observing that "decisions in sexual
harassment cases bear serious implications for every other kind of harassment
case"); see also Glaser v. Levitt, No. 98 C 210, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15343, at
**13-14 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 1998) ("Religious harassment claims are measured
by the same standards as sexual harassment claims."); cf. Dworkin & Peirce,
supra note 103, at 63 ("Sexual harassment cases in recent years have been pri-
marily responsible for shaping the major developments in harassment
law .... ").
151. See Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) ("It is well es-
tablished that an employer can be held liable under Title VII for sexual har-
assment by an employee's co-workers if the employer had actual or constructive
knowledge of the harassment and failed to address the problem adequately.");
Huffman v. City of Prairie Village, 980 F. Supp. 1192, 1202 (D. Kan. 1997) ("An
employer may be liable for sexual harassment based upon the conduct of co-
workers .... "). For prior academic discussions of this issue, see Joseph G. Alle-
gretti, Sexual Harassment of Female Employees by Nonsupervisory Coworkers:
A Theory For Liability, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 437 (1982), and Christine 0.
Merriman & Cora G. Yang, Note, Employer Liability for Co-Worker Sexual Har-
assment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 83 (1984-85).
152. However, the analogy is not entirely convincing. As one commentator
has stated,
accusations of religious harassment often raise distinctive problems.
For example, some employees might object to proselytization by co-
workers or provocative displays of religious paraphernalia. Although
both of these can undoubtedly make workers feel uncomfortable, nei-
ther is the precise equivalent of ... sexist speech designed to drive...
women from the workplace. The rules that govern these situations
must be tailored to take these differences into account.
J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295,
2296 n.3 (1999). See also Schopf, supra note 37, at 58 ("Religious harassment
must be defined separately from other forms of harassment.").
153. See Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 15, at 585 (describing "religious epi-
thets or other harassing behavior ... specifically directed at the plaintiff be-
cause of his or her religion" as "classic types of hostile environment cases"); cf.
Cameli v. O'Neal, No. 95 C 1369, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9034, at *42 (N.D. Ill.
June 20, 1997) (referring to "the typical hostile environment case where the
plaintiff has been subjected to vicious racial epithets or physically threatening
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ual harassment14 than to harassment premised upon race"5
or other class-based hostility.
To illustrate, in Peck v. Sony Music Corp.,"7 the court
held that an employee who had been subjected to unwelcome
comments concerning her religious beliefs,"' "including
statements that [she] was a sinner and would go to hell,""'.
stated a viable Title VII religious harassment claim.'' Rely-
ing upon precedent established in the sexual harassment con-
text,' the court reached this conclusion even though it was
unclear from the record whether the alleged harasser was the
plaintiffs supervisor, or merely a coworker.'62 The same re-
sult seems likely to be reached in other religious proselytizing
cases.
163
or humiliating actions") (discussing racial harassment).
154. See The Effect of the EEOC's Proposed Guidelines on Religion in the
Workplace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Admin. Practice of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 41 (1994) (statement of Professor
Douglas Laycock, Young Regents Chair in Law, University of Texas Law
School) ("The problem of unwelcome proselytizing is in many ways analogous to
the problem of unwelcome request for dates."); see also Goldsmith, supra note
128, at 1437 ("A demand that an employee alter her religious beliefs is like a
demand that an employee submit to sexual advances .... ).
155. But see Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 15, at 585 ("Logically, religious
harassment appears to be more akin to racial harassment .. "); Dworkin &
Peirce, supra note 103, at 49 ("In the few cases of religious harassment to reach
federal courts from 1976 to the 1990s, religious harassment has been treated
the same as race and national origin harassment .... ).
156. Compare Dworkin & Peirce, supra note 103, at 89 (discussing the
"[b]enign motives" involved in religious proselytizing), with BARBARA
LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW
178 (1992) (noting that sexual harassment can result from "well-intended ro-
mantic overtures").
157. Peck v. Sony Music Corp., 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1025
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
158. See id. at 1025-26 (failing to describe the plaintiffs religious beliefs, pre-
sumably because her objection to the religious proselytizing to which she was
subjected made her own beliefs essentially irrelevant); see also Shapolia v. Los
Alamos Nat'l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Title VII has been in-
terpreted to protect against requirements of religious conformity and as such
protects those who refuse to hold, as well as those who hold, specific religious
beliefs.").
159. Peck, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1025.
160. See id. at 1026.
161. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 779-80 (2d Cir. 1994)
("It will certainly be relevant to the analysis ... that the alleged harasser is the
plaintiffs supervisor rather than her co-worker .... Yet, even such a distinction
will not always be dispositive.") (citations omitted).
162. See Peck, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1025 n.1.
163. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text. But see Compston v.
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IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF TITLE VII's REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION OBLIGATION TO WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS
PROSELYTIZING
A. The Categorical Approach: Religious Proselytizing Cannot
Be Accommodated
Despite the expansive definition of religion now con-
tained in Title VII as a result of the 1972 amendment,' the
Act's reasonable accommodation provision has actually pro-
vided suprisingly little protection for religious employees in
general, 165 and religious speech in particular.' In the present
context, for example, the employer's potential liability for re-
ligious harassment may obviate its obligation to accommodate
workplace religious proselytizing.6 7 Under this view, prosely-
tizing is the type of "unusual religious speech" that cannot be
reasonably accommodated,'68 because doing so would cause
Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1976) ("It may be ... that verbal
abuse from fellow employees does not necessarily give rise to a Title VII claim
against the employer.") (citation omitted); Heitzman v. Monmouth County, 728
A.2d 297, 303 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (stating that "an employer is not
generally liable for harassing conduct by coworkers").
164. See Cooper v. Gen. Dynamics, Convair Aerospace Div., 533 F.2d 163, 168
(5th Cir. 1976) (asserting that the statutory definition "is broad - broader can
hardly be imagined"), reh'g denied, 537 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Not-
telson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 423 F. Supp. 1345, 1347 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (noting
that "Title VII was amended to include a broad definition of religion and a re-
quirement that religious beliefs of employees be accommodated"); Kaminer, su-
pra note 30, at 87 ("Religion is... defined broadly by section 701(j) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 .... ).
165. See Kalsi v. New York City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745, 758 n.7
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (discussing the "narrow breadth of the right to religious ac-
commodation under Title VII"), affd, 189 F.3d 461 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Be-
iner & DiPippa, supra note 15, at 595 ("This accommodation provision [under
Title VII] has not always operated to protect religion ... but instead has in
some instances curtailed religious practices in the workplace.").
166. See Berg, supra note 1, at 977 ("In fact, the accommodation provision
has given only limited protection to employee religious speech - just as it has
given little protection to non-speech religious conduct by employees.").
167. See Kaminer, supra note 30, at 110 (observing that "Title VII's prohibi-
tion of hostile work environment harassment can trump.., an individual's
statutory... right to religious expression in the workplace"); cf. WOLF, supra
note 23, at 131 ("The employer is not required to face a potential religious har-
assment lawsuit by ... employees subjected to [religious] proselytizing.").
168. Kaminer, supra note 30, at 141-42. See generally Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco,
Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1489 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[I]t is certainly conceivable that par-
ticular jobs may be completely incompatible with particular religious prac-
tices.... Employers faced with such conflicts should be able to meet their bur-
den by showing that no accommodation is possible.").
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the employer undue hardship by exposing it to potential Title
VII liability to its other employees.'69
The Fourth Circuit reached this conclusion in Chalmers
v. Tulon Co. of Richmond.'" In Chalmers, a management
level employee wrote letters to two coworkers,17' one of whom
was her supervisor, 72 accusing them of "immorality"7' and
"ungodly, shameful conduct."'74 When she was discharged for
writing the letters, she brought suit alleging that her em-
ployer had unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis
of her religion in violation of Title VII.'7
The plaintiff contended that, as an evangelical Christian,
she had a religious duty to share the gospel,'76 and looked for
opportunities to do so.' She maintained that her letter
writing was therefore a statutorily protected religious activ-
ity,178 and that the employer should have accommodated that
activity by imposing a less severe punishment than dis-
charge,7 9 even if the letters otherwise would have provided a
legitimate basis for her termination.'
The court acknowledged that an employer generally must
attempt to accommodate an employee's religious expression,
even if the expression would provide a legitimate basis for the
employee's termination in the absence of any religious moti-
vation."' In the face of a vigorous dissent,'82 the court never-
169. See generally Wilson v. U.S. W. Communications, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 665,
675-76 (D. Neb. 1994) ("Exposing an employer to legal liability is considered an
undue hardship."), affd, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995).
170. Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1996).
171. See id. at 1014-18.
172. See id. at 1014.
173. Id. at 1021.
174. Id. at 1020.
175. See id. at 1017.
176. See id. at 1014. See generally Henderson v. Stanton, 76 F. Supp. 2d 10,
13-14 (D.D.C. 1999) (discussing the "religious duty" of evangelical Christians to
"communicate the gospel by all available means").
177. See Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1014; cf. Stephen v. Maximum Sec. & Inves-
tigations, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 4313 (RWS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17335, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2000) (describing an employee whose religious beliefs "re-
quire [d] him to proselytize every day at every opportunity").
178. See Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1017. The plaintiff asserted that "her relig-
ious beliefs required her to write such letters, i.e., that she was 'led by the Lord'
to write them." Id. at 1021. The court, in turn, indicated that it did not "in any
way question the sincerity of [her] religious beliefs or practices." Id.
179. See id. at 1017.
180. See id. at 1018.
181. See id.; cf. Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1362 (S.D.
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theless rejected the plaintiffs argument,"' holding that relig-
ious proselytizing is not the type of conduct an employer can
possibly accommodate.
8 4
The court explained that requiring the accommodation of
workplace proselytizing would leave the employer "between a
rock and a hard place" by exposing it to potential liability for
violating the statutory rights of other employees.' In par-
ticular, permitting employees to engage in religious prosely-
tizing might subject the employer to Title VII claims by other
employees asserting that the proselytizing constituted unlaw-
ful religious harassment.'
This reasoning reflects the analysis in the "leading
precedent" addressing an employer's obligation to accommo-
Fla. 1999) ("In a religious accommodation case, an employee can establish a
claim even though he... cannot rebut an employer's legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.").
182. See Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1021-27 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). Among
other things, the dissent noted that the majority had concluded that accommo-
dation of the plaintiffs conduct was not possible "[w]ithout [the employer] even
taking a position that it could not accommodate [the plaintiffs] religious prac-
tice." Id. at 1027 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized this analysis
in the following terms:
The majority's holding that [the plaintiffs] conduct was beyond ac-
commodation is ... remarkable in light of the fact that the statute im-
poses the burden on the employer to demonstrate that a religious prac-
tice cannot be accommodated without undue hardship. The parties
have not even been given an opportunity to explore that issue at trial.
By ruling that as a matter of law [the plaintiffs] conduct was not sus-
ceptible to accommodation, the majority in effect shifts to Title VII
plaintiffs the burden of refuting a defense that the defendant neither
asserted nor demonstrated.
Id. (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
183. The court was particularly critical of the plaintiffs contention that the
employer "should have attempted to accommodate her by giving her a sanction
less than discharge, such as a warning." Id. at 1020. Characterizing this as a
"false issue," the court explained "[there is nothing in Title VII that requires
employers to give lesser punishments to employees who claim, after they violate
company rules (or at the same time), that their religion caused them to trans-
gress the rules." Id.
184. See id. at 1021; cf. Johnson v. Halls Merch., Inc., 49 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 527, 528-29 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (adopting an employer's argument that
it "could not reasonably accommodate, without undue hardship, plaintiffs re-
ligious beliefs which required her to preface nearly every sentence she spoke
with the phrase 'In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth."').
185. Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1021.
186. See id.; cf. Weiss v. Ren Labs., 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 73, 80
(S.D. Fla. 1999) (noting that religious proselytizing puts the employer "in a posi-
tion of possibly losing employees to resignation or, worse, being sued by employ-
ees for tolerating a religiously hostile work environment").
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date religious practices,187 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison,'88 upon which the Chalmers court in fact relied.9
The issue in Hardison was the extent of an employer's duty to
accommodate an employee whose religious beliefs prohibited
him from working on his Sabbath.9 ' In holding that an em-
ployer is not required to provide an accommodation that
would "require [it] to bear more than a de minimis cost," 9' the
Supreme Court interpreted Title VII in the following manner:
The repeated, unequivocal emphasis of both the language
and the legislative history of Title VII is on eliminating
discrimination in employment, and such discrimination is
proscribed when it is directed against majorities as well as
minorities.... It would be anomalous to conclude that by
"reasonable accommodation" Congress meant that an em-
ployer must deny the [rights] of some employees ... in or-
der to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others,
and we conclude that Title VII does not require an em-
ployer to go that far.1
92
187. Drazewski v. Waukegan Dev. Ctr., 651 F. Supp. 754, 757 (N.D. Ill.
1986); see also Ka Nam Kuan v. City of Chicago, 563 F. Supp. 255, 258 (N.D. Ill.
1983) ("The leading case in this area is Trans World Airlines v. Hardison .... ");
Gregory J. Gawlik, Note, The Politics of Religion: "Reasonable Accommodations"
and the Establishment Clause An Analysis of the Workplace Religious Freedom
Act, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249, 252 (1999) ("The seminal decision in Title VII re-
ligious discrimination litigation is Trans World Airlines v. Hardison.").
188. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). For a prior
academic discussion of Hardison, see Sara L. Silbiger, Note, Heaven Can Wait:
Judicial Interpretation of Title VII's Religious Accommodation Requirement
Since Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 839 (1985).
189. See Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1018. But see infra notes 273-305 and ac-
companying text (arguing that Hardison should not be read to support the cate-
gorical approach adopted in cases like Chalmers).
190. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 66. One court described the situation in
which "an employee is requesting an adjustment in his work schedule to permit
him to observe his sabbath" as the "typical accommodation case." Spratt v.
County of Kent, 621 F. Supp. 594, 599 (W.D. Mich. 1985). Indeed, litigants have
occasionally argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that the duty to accommodate is lim-
ited to this particular religious practice. See, e.g., Cooper v. Gen. Dynamics,
Convair Aerospace Div., 533 F.2d 163, 168-69 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1976), reh'g de-
nied, 537 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1977). For a prior academic discussion of the ac-
commodation requirement's application in this situation, see Clare Zerangue,
Comment, Sabbath Observance and the Workplace: Religion Clause Analysis
and Title VII's Reasonable Accommodation Rule, 46 LA. L. REV. 1265 (1986).
191. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84.
192. Id. at 81; see also Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 552 (6th
Cir. 1975) ("The reasonable accommodation rule, like Title VII as a whole, was
intended to prevent discrimination in employment."), affd by an equally divided
Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), vacated on reh'g, 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
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B. The Balancing Approach: Religious Proselytizing Can Be
Accommodated In Some Circumstances
As discussed in Section III above,193 the concern expressed
in Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond' with an employer's
potential liability for workplace religious proselytizing is not
merely speculative.'99 Nevertheless, relatively few courts have
embraced the Fourth Circuit's seemingly categorical view
that workplace proselytizing cannot possibly be accommo-
dated.19 Most courts instead have concluded that an em-
ployer addressing such conduct must attempt to balance the
proselytizing employee's right to engage in a protected relig-
ious practice with the right of other employees to work in an
environment free from religious harassment.'97
1. Brown v. Polk County
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Brown v. Polk County9 '
is a prominent example of a court employing this balancing
approach.9 The plaintiff in Brown was a born-again Chris-
tian °° whose religious beliefs played "a central part in his
193. See supra notes 97-163 and accompanying text.
194. Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1996).
195. See WOLF, supra note 23, at 61 (observing that "proselytizing activi-
ties ... may give rise to harassment claims by employees who object to the
proselytizing"); Schopf, supra note 37, at 59 ("Proselytization ... can rise to the
level of harassment.... ."). But see Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Aguilar, 120 S.
Ct. 2029, 2031 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("At-
taching liability to the utterance of words in the workplace is likely invalid for
the simple reason that this speech is fully protected speech.").
196. See Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1021. For a critical assessment of the analy-
sis in Chalmers, see Kaminer, supra note 30, at 112-14.
197. See generally Schopf, supra note 37, at 49 ("[Tlhe balanced approach...
suggests a way to resolve the tension between freedom to observe and freedom
from observance, by recognizing the need to protect employees from unwanted
religious advances in the workplace, while still allowing for a certain level of
healthy religious expression.").
198. Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995).
199. Because the plaintiff in Brown was a government employee, his relig-
ious proselytizing had free speech implications that are beyond the scope of this
article. See id. at 654 ("In cases such as this one,... where a government is the
employer, we must consider both the first amendment [sic] and Title VII in de-
termining the legitimacy of the [employer's] action."). For a prior academic dis-
cussion of the constitutional issue, see Brian Richards, Comment, The Bounda-
ries of Religious Speech in the Government Workplace, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 745 (1998).
200. See Brown, 61 F.3d at 652. One court has indicated that it was "not
aware of any organized religious group bearing the label 'born-again Chris-
tians,"' but assumed that the term refers to "those Protestants who consider
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life."" 1 Although the employer did not dispute the sincerity of
those beliefs,2 2 it made no effort to accommodate the plain-
tiffs religious activities."' The employer instead instructed
him to refrain from using its resources in any way that could
be perceived as supporting a particular religious activity or
organization, 2°4 and forced him to remove all religious items
from his office, including a Bible he kept in his desk.0 5
The employer also reprimanded the plaintiff for engaging
in religious activities,"' and directed him to "cease any activi-
ties that could be considered to be religious proselytizing,
witnessing, or counseling."0 7 When he was subsequently
terminated in part for occasionally allowing prayers in his of-
fice, citing Bible passages, and "affirming his Christianity,"
2 8
the plaintiff brought suit alleging that the employer had dis-
criminated against him on the basis of his religion in viola-
tion of Title VII.
20 9
The employer argued that accommodating the plaintiffs
religious activities could have created the perception that it
would favor employees who shared his religious beliefs when
their conversion to be a spiritual rebirth." Vitug v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 88
F.3d 506, 510 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing John 1:12-13, 3:3-6). In any event, lack
of membership in a formally organized religion does not prevent an employee
from claiming the protection of Title VII, because "a religious belief does not
have to be espoused or accepted by any religious group to fall within the defini-
tion of 'religion' under Title VII." Van Koten v. Family Health Mgmt., Inc., 955
F. Supp. 898, 902 (N.D. Ill. 1997). But cf. Edwards v. Sch. Bd. of City of Norton,
Va., 483 F. Supp. 620, 624 (W.D. Va. 1980) (asserting that, in order to be pro-
tected under Title VII, an employee's religious belief "must have an institutional
quality about it"), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 658 F.2d 951 (4th
Cir. 1981).
201. Brown, 61 F.3d at 658.
202. See id. (noting that the employer offered "no challenge to [the plaintiffs]
testimony" concerning his religious beliefs).
203. See id. at 654.
204. See id. at 652-53. This instruction undoubtedly reflects the employer's
familiarity with the First Amendment principle that "government should not
prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion." Rd. of Educ. of Kirya
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994).
205. See Brown, 61 F.3d at 653. See generally Tucker v. Cal. Dep't of Educ.,
97 F.3d 1204, 1216 (9th Cir. 1996) (observing that "there is a legitimate state
interest in preventing displays of religious objects that might suggest state en-
dorsement of religion").
206. See Brown, 61 F.3d at 654.
207. Id. at 652.
208. Id. at 654, 655.
209. See id. at 653.
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making personnel decisions, 10 and thus eventually would
have led to "polarization between born-again Christian em-
ployees and other employees." 1 However, the court dis-
agreed, noting that there was no evidence that any personnel
decisions were actually affected by the plaintiffs religious be-
liefs,2 ' or that any employee concerns with respect to this is-
sue were legitimate or reasonable. 3 Because there had been
no actual imposition on other employees or disruption of the
employer's workplace, 14 the court held that the employer
violated Title VII by failing to accommodate the plaintiffs
"occasional spontaneous prayers and isolated references to
Christian belief."
2 15
In contrast to the analysis in Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of
Richmond,"6 the Brown court rejected the contention that an
employer's interest in avoiding potential religious harassment
claims permits it to categorically prohibit religious expression
in the workplace.217 The court explained:
We may concede for the sake of argument that [an em-
ployer] has a legal right to ensure that its workplace is
free from religious activity that harasses or intimidates.
But any interference with religious activity that the exer-
cise of that right entails must be reasonably related to the
exercise of that right and must be narrowly tailored to its
achievement.18
The court here was specifically discussing the plaintiffs
210. See id. at 656. See generally Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 849 F.
Supp. 544, 551 n.5 (W.D. Mich. 1994) ("[Aln employer who acts at its staffs be-
hest can become a conduit for its employees' religious approbation of a fellow
employee. In that type of case, although the employer may not share its staffs
discriminatory impulses, its choice to act on them remains an illegal employ-
ment practice."), affd in part and rev'd in part, 85 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1996).
211. Brown, 61 F.3d at 656.
212. See id. at 657. See generally Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461,
1473 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[H]ypothetical morale problems are clearly insufficient to
establish undue hardship.").
213. See Brown, 61 F.3d at 657.
214. See id.; cf. Kolodziej v. Smith, 588 N.E.2d 634, 638 (Mass. 1992) (holding
that an employer's use of "Scriptural passages as support for the lessons it
sought to promote" did not warrant a finding that it had "forced the plaintiff to
alter her religious convictions or her profession of belief, or to give the appear-
ance of supporting a particular tenet of religion").
215. Brown, 61 F.3d at 657.
216. Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond,101 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1996); see
supra notes 170-86 and accompanying text.
217. See Brown, 61 F.3d at 659.
218. Id. at 658.
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First Amendment right to engage in religious expression, as
opposed to his statutory right to do so. 19 However, because
the EEOC has taken the position that "the protections of the
Act against religious discrimination can be no broader or nar-
rower than the protections afforded by the First Amend-
ment,"22° the court's reasoning appears equally applicable to
the plaintiffs Title VII claim. 2 ' Indeed, one commentator dis-
cussing the employer's statutory duty to accommodate relig-
ious practices. has expressed essentially the same view as
the court in Brown: "Ensuring that the workplace is free from
religious intimidation or harassment is a proper goal, but re-
lated efforts need to be narrowly structured to avoid elimi-
nating religion from the workplace entirely."
223
2. Banks v. Service America Corp.
The Eighth Circuit is not the only court to conclude that
an employer's prohibition of workplace religious proselytizing
may be actionable under Title VII. 224  In Banks v. Service
America Corp.,225 the plaintiffs were food service employees
who were discharged for greeting their employer's customers
with expressions such as "God bless you" and "Praise the
219. See id. at 657-59.
220. EEOC Dec. No. 85-3, 1985 EEOC LEXIS 2, at *4 (Feb. 12, 1985); see also
Weitkenaut v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (D. Vt.
1974) (asserting that in enacting Title VII, "Congress intended to protect the
same rights in private employment that the Constitution protects in the gov-
ernmental domain").
221. See generally Wardlow v. Great Lakes Express Co., 339 N.W.2d 670, 676
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (observing that "a Title VII religious discrimination
case ... implicates the First Amendment"); Gilmer & Anderson, supra note 23,
at 329 ("Title VII's accommodation requirement expresses the First Amend-
ment's explicit intention to protect the rights of conscience and expression of re-
ligious beliefs.").
222. See Shopf, supra note 37, at 52 n.93:
Private employers do not have the same First Amendment concerns as
their government counterparts. But, beyond the fact that it is good
policy not to broadly ban or limit activities, private employers will still
encounter possible Title VII problems if, for instance, such bans lead to
a failure to reasonably accommodate employees' religious beliefs.
223. Id. at 52.
224. In addition, one commentator has stated: "[Miuch speech that might be
considered religious harassment may itself be an exercise of religious liberty
that the employer is obligated to accommodate. Disciplining an employee on the
basis of such expression might itself be unlawful religious discrimination under
Title VII." Estlund, supra note 96, at 747 n.241 (citation omitted).
225. Banks v. Serv. Am. Corp., 952 F. Supp. 703 (D. Kan. 1996).
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Lord."226 When the plaintiffs subsequently brought suit under
Title VII,227 the employer argued that it could not reasonably
have accommodated this religious practice,228 and thus had
lawfully terminated the plaintiffs' employment when they re-
fused to cease extending religious greetings to its custom-
ers.
229
The court held that the plaintiffs had presented a genu-
ine issue for trial with respect to whether terminating their
employment on this basis was unlawful.2 3  The court ac-
knowledged that a number of the employer's customers had
complained that the plaintiffs' greetings were inappropri-
ate.231 It nevertheless rejected the employer's argument that
the plaintiffs' jobs were thus incompatible with their method
of greeting customers,2 2 and that permitting the plaintiffs to
remain in their positions would have constituted an undue
hardship.233
In reaching this result, the court noted the absence of any
evidence that the employer had actually lost any customers
as a result of the plaintiffs' conduct.24  The court acknowl-
edged that customer discomfort with the plaintiffs' religious
226. See id. at 705, 707.
227. See id. at 705.
228. See id. at 707-708. See generally LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 156,
at 402 (observing that "employees must not only refrain from... harassing
their co-workers, but must also refrain from harassing customers, clients, and
other nonemployees with whom they deal in their employment").
229. See Banks, 952 F. Supp. at 708.
230. See id. at 711; cf. Thomas v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 990 F. Supp.
81, 88 (D. Conn. 1998) (holding that whether a hospital had validly disciplined a
proselytizing employee "because her religious speech annoyed and disturbed pa-
tients" was "[an] issue for a factfinder to decide").
231. See Banks, 952 F. Supp. at 707 & n.2.
232. See id. at 709. The court stated:
[T]he fact that [the employer] received assorted complaints ... does
not, standing alone, demonstrate that plaintiffs' jobs were "completely
incompatible" with their practice of extending religious greetings to
food service customers. Given the volume of customers served (2,000 to
3,000 per day), plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of the favorable in-
ference that 20 to 25 complaints over a three-month period presented
no material problem for [the employer].
Id. at 710.
233. See id. at 709.
234. See id. at 710; see generally Paul F. Gerhart, Employee Privacy Rights in
the United States, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 175, 179-80 (1995) ("[A]n employer must
prove that accommodating a religious [practice] would pose undue hard-
ship .... The maintenance of a company's public image is not a sufficient basis
to withstand a claim based on religion.").
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greetings ultimately could lead to a loss of business,235 but
nevertheless concluded that any assertion that the plaintiffs'
conduct was likely to have a material impact on the em-
ployer's profitability was "more hypothetical than real.5 36
In this respect, the court indicated that an employer
must present evidence of "tangible present costs" of an ac-
commodation, rather than speculative evidence of its future
impact.2 37 Because the employer in Banks had presented no
such evidence, it failed to establish that permitting the
plaintiffs to continue extending the customer greetings would
have imposed more than a de minimis burden.9
Although the Banks court concluded that the plaintiffs
were not necessarily attempting to proselytize or impose their
religious beliefs on the employer's customers,24 ° its holding
presumably did not depend on this conclusion.24' Given the
235. See Banks, 952 F. Supp. at 710. It is not entirely clear that a demon-
strable loss of business due to customer dissatisfaction would have been suffi-
cient to justify the employer's actions in any event. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[I]t would be totally anoma-
lous ... to allow the preferences and prejudices of the [employer's] customers to
determine whether ... discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large ex-
tent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome.").
236. Banks, 952 F. Supp. at 710. The court stated:
[lit is not even clear that a boycott by those who objected to plaintiffs'
greetings would have had any material impact on the profitability or
operation of [the employer's] business - either because they were few in
number or because (since [the employer] operated various food stations)
patrons could choose whether to encounter or to avoid an encounter
with plaintiffs.
Id.
237. Id. at 711 (quoting Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir.
1992)); cf. Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (D.D.C. 1979) ("[I]t
seems to this Court that 'undue hardship' must mean present undue hardship,
as distinguished from anticipated.., hardship.").
238. The court noted that "[t]he burden [is on] the employer to show reason-
able accommodation, or that reasonable accommodation would be an undue
hardship." Banks, 952 F. Supp. at 708.
239. See id. at 709.
240. Id. at 711; cf. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 825 n.1
(5th Cir. 1999) (Jolly, J., dissenting) ("[T]he term 'proselytize' is ... a word used
- sometimes pejoratively - in lieu of the term 'persuade."'); Springfield v. San
Diego Unified Port Dist., 950 F. Supp. 1482, 1487 n.7 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("Recent
case law discussing 'proselytizing' consistently refers to that term as a form of
religious persuasion.") (emphasis added).
241. See generally Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981) (indicat-
ing that "religious appeals to nonbelievers constitute[] 'protected speech') (cit-
ing Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)).
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court's finding (which the employer did not dispute)22 that the
customer greetings were an expression of the plaintiffs' sin-
cerely held religious beliefs, 43 the proper focus was not on the
precise nature of the plaintiffs' conduct,2 4 but on whether that
conduct had disrupted the employer's business. 5
Indeed, the employer's statutory duty to accommodate an
employee's religious observance or practice2 46 can arise from
any religiously motivated conduct 2 17 or speech,248 and the court
clearly recognized that the plaintiffs' greetings constituted
protected religious speech.2 9  Because the term "proselytize"
ordinarily contemplates some form of "religious advocacy," 5 ° a
242. The employer "concede[d] that [the] plaintiffs ... established a prima
facie case of religious discrimination," which necessarily included a showing
that they held "a bona fide religious belief that conflict[ed] with an employment
requirement." Banks, 952 F. Supp. at 708.
243. See id. at 705.
244. Courts are poorly suited to such tasks. See Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics
Convair Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp. 782, 791 n.19 (S.D. Cal. 1980) (referring to
"the problems involved in such a process of definition"), rev'd on other grounds,
648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1981). But cf. Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc.,
84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1581, 1589 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (finding it "neces-
sary to specifically and clearly define [the employee's] religious practice").
245. See Banks, 952 F. Supp. at 710 (addressing whether the plaintiffs' re-
ligious speech had "imposed undue hardship on [the employer's] operations or
materially disrupted its work routine").
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994).
247. See Cooper v. Gen. Dynamics, Convair Aerospace Div., 533 F.2d 163, 168(5th Cir. 1976) (noting that "all forms and aspects of religion, however eccentric,
are protected"), reh'g denied, 537 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1977); Anderson, 84 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1588-89 ("It is of no consequence that the practice is
not required by the tenets of [the employee's] religion. It matters only that [the]
practice ... was religiously motivated.") (citations omitted).
248. See Berg, supra note 1, at 979 ("Speech is certainly a form of religious
'practice or observance,' indeed a particularly common form."); Gilmer & Ander-
son, supra note 23, at 341 ("The line between mere speech and 'observance or
practice' is ... too faint and uncertain to support [the] contention that Title VII
does not protect religious expression.").
249. The court stated:
Plaintiffs are Christians who feel strongly that because of what God
has done for them and the joy He has given them by changing their
lives dramatically, they must say things that are positive, uplifting and
inspirational to people with whom they speak, and their religious
greetings emanate from this belief .... Honoring God through their
speech, through such greetings, was a deep seated sincerely held relig-
ious belief and plaintiffs could not stop the practice without violating
their beliefs.
Banks, 952 F. Supp. at 707 (footnote omitted).
250. Springfield v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 950 F. Supp. 1482, 1487(S.D. Cal. 1996); see also Goldsmith, supra note 128, at 1438 ("The purpose of
proselytizing is to induce another person's religious conversion.").
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finding that the plaintiffs were proselytizing' should not
have altered the result in Banks,2 2 despite the court's appar-
ent reluctance to characterize their conduct in that fashion.253
3. Wilson v. U.S. West Communications
Courts utilizing the balancing approach have also
reached results favoring the employer."4 In Wilson v. U.S.
West Communications,255 for example, the plaintiff was a Ro-
man Catholic woman who wore a graphic anti-abortion but-
ton at work 256 as part of a personal religious vow. 257 The but-
ton caused immediate emotional reactions among the
251 ofplaintiffs coworkers, some of whom accused the company of
harassment for permitting her to wear the button.259 After
the plaintiff refused the employer's request that she cover the
button while at work, 0 her employment was terminated.26'
251. Proselytization obviously can take various forms, some of which may be
rather subtle. See Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. Dist. of Ladue, 28 F.3d
1501, 1516 (8th Cir. 1994) (Bright, J., dissenting). But see Chandler v. James,
998 F. Supp. 1255, 1283 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (criticizing the assumption that "all
discussion or reference to Jesus ... [and] any discussion of Mother Theresa...
would [necessarily] be religious or have the purpose or effect of proselytizing").
252. See Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerue, 84 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th
Cir. 1996) (rejecting the contention that "proselytizing religious speech... en-
joys a lesser degree of... protection than does religious speech that is not in-
tended to recruit new believers").
253. The court instead characterized the plaintiffs' religious practice as
"blessing" the employer's customers. Banks, 952 F. Supp. at 708, 710.
254. See generally Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1181 (D.D.C.
1979) (observing that "courts have sometimes held for and sometimes against
the complaining employee") (footnotes omitted).
255. Wilson v. U.S. W. Communications, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995).
256. See id. at 1338. The button depicted "an eighteen to twenty-week old
fetus," and "contained the phrases 'Stop Abortion,' and 'They're Forgetting
Someone.'" Id. at 1339.
257. See id. at 1339. In particular, the plaintiff vowed to wear the button "at
all times, unless she was sleeping or bathing," until there was "an end to abor-
tion or ... she could no longer fight the fight." Id. (bracketing omitted). That
opposition to abortion is a tenet of the Catholic faith seems beyond dispute. See,
e.g., Fausto v. Diamond, 589 F. Supp. 451, 460-61 (D.R.I. 1984) ("It is undenia-
bly true.., that the Roman Catholic Church is militant in its opposition to
abortion, and that the Church regards the obligation to preserve human life as
religiously-based and theologically imposed.").
258. See Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1338. See generally Nickerson v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 900 F.2d 412, 418 (1st Cir. 1990) (referring to "the fierce emotional reaction
that is engendered in many people when the subject of abortion surfaces in any
manner").
259. See Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1339.
260. The court noted that the employer had actually offered the plaintiff
"three options: (1) wear the button only in her work cubicle, leaving the button
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The plaintiff brought suit against the employer claiming
religious discrimination in violation of Title VII.2 2 The trial
court entered judgment in favor of the employer, 263 and the
plaintiff appealed.24 The plaintiff argued that the trial court
erred in concluding that the employer offered her a reason-
able accommodation, and in holding that her own accommo-
dation proposals would have imposed an undue hardship on
the employer.265
In concluding that the employer could not have accom-
modated the plaintiffs religious practice without undue hard-
ship, 66 the trial court focused on the workplace disruption
caused by the anti-abortion button. 27 However, the plaintiff
argued on appeal that the accommodation obligation estab-
lished by the EEOC guidelines (and now also contained in Ti-
tle VII itself)2 6 was "paramount to [other employees'] alleged
frustrations with the button." '269 She claimed that the em-
ployer simply should have instructed her coworkers to ignore
the button and do their jobs.27
in the cubicle when she moved around the office; (2) cover the button while at
work; or (3) wear a different button with the same message but without the pho-
tograph." Id.
261. See id. at 1338.
262. See id.
263. See Wilson v. U.S. W. Communications, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 665, 676 (D.
Neb. 1994), affd, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995). Although the claim in Wilson
was tried to the court, see Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1338, most Title VII religious dis-
crimination claims are now jury-eligible. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994);
LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 55, at 255.
264. See Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1338, 1340.
265. See id. at 1338.
266. See Wilson, 860 F. Supp. at 676.
267. The court stated:
Wilson's coworkers were disturbed, distressed, and offended by the but-
ton which Wilson wore. A labor grievance was filed on account of the
button. Wilson's coworkers balked at attending company meetings
which involved Wilson's wearing the button and became angry and
frustrated by management's inability to resolve the issue. At various
times, Wilson's coworkers threatened to walk off their jobs. A company
counselor had to confer with Wilson's coworkers concerning the un-
pleasant work environment attributable to the presence of the button
in the workplace. Loss of efficiency and productivity as well as the ex-
penditure of time and energy in attempts to alleviate the acrimonious
atmosphere ... presented more than a de minimis cost to [the com-
pany].
Id. at 675.
268. See supra notes 64-65, 86-93 and accompanying text.
269. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1340.
270. See id. at 1341. See generally Berg, supra note 1, at 978 ("To accommo-
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However, the Eighth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs ar-
gument, noting that the employer had been unable to per-
suade its other employees to ignore the button."' The court
stated:
Although [the plaintiffs] religious beliefs did not create
scheduling conflicts or violate dress code or safety rules,
[her] position would require [the company] to allow [her]
to impose her beliefs as she chooses .... To simply instruct
[her] co-workers that they must accept [her] insistence on
wearing a particular depiction of a fetus as part of her re-
ligious beliefs is antithetical to the concept of reasonable
accommodation.272
C. Evaluating the Two Approaches
Although the trial court in Wilson purported to be em-
ploying a balancing approach,' the Eighth Circuit's analysis
more closely resembles the categorical approach adopted in
Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond .274 In particular, both the
Eighth Circuit in Wilson and the Fourth Circuit in Chalm-
ers27 5 relied on that portion of Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison 27 in which the Supreme Court indicated that Title
VII's reasonable accommodation provision does not require
employers to deny the rights of some employees in order to
accommodate the religious practices of others 277
Other courts have also interpreted Hardison as permit-
ting an employer to avoid Title VII liability for failing to ac-
commodate an employee's religious practice by demonstrating
that the accommodation would have compromised the rights
date [religious] speech, the employer often needs to do no more than inform
other employees not to be bothered or distracted by the speech.").
271. See Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1341.
272. Id.
273. See Wilson v. U.S. W. Communications, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D.
Neb. 1994) ("[C]ooperation of both an employee and an employer is needed in
finding a 'reasonable accommodation' that reconciles an employee's religious
practices or beliefs with the needs of an employer's business."), affd, 58 F.3d
1337 (8th Cir. 1995).
274. Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1996); see
also Gilmer & Anderson, supra note 23, at 330 & n.12 (describing Wilson as an
example of a case in which a court "resolved the issue by... concluding that
any [proselytizing] conduct, no matter how well intended, may constitute har-
assment").
275. See supra notes 170-86 and accompanying text.
276. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
277. See id. at 81; see also supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
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of other employees.278 In fact, employers relying on Hardison
"have routinely defended refusals to accommodate religious
practices by citing the effect that an accommodation might
have on other employees, and courts have routinely held that
such effects constitute undue hardship for the employer."279
One such court has suggested that any other interpretation
would effectively compel the employer to "discriminate[]
against its other employees on the basis of their religious be-
liefs. 28°
Under this particular reading of Hardison,281 Title VII
does not require an employer to impose upon other employees
in order to accommodate the religious needs of any particular
employee. 82  Although this view typically arises in cases in
which the potential accommodation would impair other em-
ployees' contractual seniority rights,282 it also appears to ab-
solve employers of any obligation to permit an employee to
278. See, e.g., Brown v. Polk County, 832 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 & n.18 (S.D.
Iowa 1993) (citing Hardison and stating that "an employer may... meet the
undue hardship standard by establishing the accommodation would compromise
the rights of others"), affd in part and rev'd in part, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995);
EEOC v. Caribe Hilton Int'l, 597 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 (D.P.R. 1984) (citing
Hardison for the proposition that "the duty to accommodate requires that the
employer take certain affirmative measures to satisfy the employee's religious
practices, but without ... hindering the rights of other employees").
279. Kalsi v. New York City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745, 757 (E.D.N.Y.
1998), affd, 189 F.3d 461 (2d Cir. 1999); cf. Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734
F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) ("An employer may prove that an [accommoda-
tion] would involve undue hardship by showing that.., its impact on cowork-
ers ... would be more than de minimis.").
280. Ka Nam Kuan v. City of Chicago, 563 F. Supp. 255, 258 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(emphasis added); cf. Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics, 489 F. Supp. 782, 790 (S.D.
Cal. 1980) (asserting that "the accommodation provision mandates religious dis-
crimination"), rev'd on other grounds, 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1981).
281. See generally Drazewski v. Waukegan Dev. Ctr., 651 F. Supp. 754, 757
(N.D. Ill. 1986) ("In the wake of Hardison various approaches to the accommo-
dation problem have emerged."); Edwards v. Sch. Bd. of City of Norton, Va., 483
F. Supp. 620, 625 (W.D. Va. 1980) ("Post-Hardison decisions have differed over
the parameters of the employer's obligation under the accommodation clause."),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 658 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981).
282. See McIntyre-Handy v. West Telemktg. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 718, 736
(E.D. Va. 2000) ("Imposing on other employees to create an accommodation is
not required by Title VII.").
283. See, e.g., Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 338 (8th Cir. 1992). In
fact, one court has asserted that "where the seniority issue does not arise, the
opinion [in Hardison] is of little aid." Drazewski, 651 F. Supp. at 757; see also
Brandes, supra note 31, at 620 ("It is difficult, if not impossible, to cull from the
[Hardison] opinion law which will serve as precedent in other religious dis-
crimination cases.").
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engage in workplace religious proselytizing that other em-
ployees would find objectionable.284
However, not only does this reasoning potentially emas-
culate the employer's affirmative obligation to accommodate
religious practices, 285 but it also actually may result in relig-
ious employees being treated less favorably than other pro-
tected Title VII classes.286 Indeed, to the extent the court in
Wilson v. U.S. West Communications..7 held that the objec-
tions of an individual's coworkers were sufficient to preclude
her from - and ultimately terminate her for - engaging in
statutorily protected religious speech, the court's reasoning
is contrary to the result likely to be reached in any other Title
VII context."'
The EEOC, for example, generally holds that the "prefer-
ences of coworkers" should provide no defense to the conten-
tion that an employer has violated Title VII.29° Courts have
consistently reached the same conclusion. 9' One set of com-
284. See, e.g., Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 977 (7th Cir. 1997)
(noting that a supervisor may not "impose his religious views on ... his subor-
dinate"); Wilson v. U.S. W. Communications, 58 F.3d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir. 1995)
("Title VII does not require an employer to allow an employee to impose his re-
ligious views on others."); cf. Banks v. Serv. Am. Corp., 952 F. Supp. 703, 710
(D. Kan. 1996) ("Title VII does not necessarily require an employer to allow an
employee to impose his religious views on customers.").
285. See Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 1979)
("Carried to its logical conclusion the... language [of Hardison] would preclude
all forms of accommodation and defeat the very purpose behind § 2000e(j)."); cf.
Drazewski, 651 F. Supp. at 759 (asserting that a literal reading of Hardison
"amounts to an emasculation of the statutory duty of accommodation"); Bran-
des, supra note 31, at 620 (stating that "the reasonable accommodation stan-
dard ... was essentially emasculated by the majority opinion" in Hardison).
286. See generally Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 15, at 577 (asserting that
"religious employees are often treated less favorably than nonreligious employ-
ees in the workplace").
287. Wilson v. U.S. W. Communications, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995).
288. See Berg, supra note 1, at 979 (indicating that the Wilson court effec-
tively held that "the negative reactions of other employees per se suffice to jus-
tify restricting an employee's speech").
289. See Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 15, at 605 (observing that "the courts
do not permit employers to refuse to hire an employee based on sex or race...
because of customer preference," and that it is "logical" to extend this reasoning
to "co-worker preferences"); Berg, supra note 1, at 979 (noting that "an employer
can in no way justify a refusal to hire blacks or women on the ground that hir-
ing them would disturb other employees").
290. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(iii) (1999).
291. See, e.g., Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 681 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("To per-
mit an employer to circumvent the dictates of [an] antidiscrimination stat-
ute ... because the prejudices of its employees commanded it to do so would be
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mentators analyzing this principle has observed that "[i]f a
woman caused a commotion on the job because she is, for ex-
ample, the first woman firefighter, the courts certainly would
not allow the fire department to justify her termination" on
that basis.
The analysis ordinarily should be no different where the
workplace "commotion" is caused by an employee's statutorily
protected religious speech,293 which, in light of the employer's
affirmative duty to accommodate religious practices, is ar-
guably entitled to even more protection than an employee's
protected gender status. '94 As has been noted elsewhere:
The point of antidiscrimination laws is to open up em-
ployment opportunities for individuals in spite of differ-
ences. Allowing co-workers to stifle the religious beliefs of
others (often resulting in the termination or constructive
discharge of the religious employee) is antithetical to these
principles, and results in a burden being placed on relig-
ious employees because of their religion.295
This reasoning suggests that despite the seemingly con-
trary language in Hardison, Title VII may require an em-
ployer to accommodate religious proselytizing 97 even in cases
where the accommodation would be "detrimental to other em-
ployees."'2 9 In this respect, proselytizing appears to be no dif-
'totally anomalous."') (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385,
389 (5th Cir. 1971)); Bagley v. Watson, 579 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Or. 1983)
("It is impermissible ... to refuse to hire an individual.., because of the prefer-
ences of co-workers .... ).
292. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 15, at 605 n.175.
293. See Miller v. Drennon, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 274, 281 (D.S.C.
1991) ("If an employee could pick and choose which of his fellow employees he is
willing to work with based on those employees' willingness to comply with his
notion of moral or [religious] behavior, the workplace would be chaotic.").
294. See Kaminer, supra note 30, at 97 (observing that "religious speech is
entitled to special protection under ... Title VII"); cf. Beiner & DiPippa, supra
note 15, at 595 ("Unlike other forms of discrimination protected [sic] under Title
VII, religion is accorded additional protection: an employer must reasonably ac-
commodate an employee's religious beliefs.") (footnotes omitted).
295. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 15, at 606.
296. See supra notes 187-192 and accompanying text.
297. See Berg, supra note 1, at 983 ("Had the Eighth Circuit [in Wilson]
taken the concept of accommodation seriously, it would have required more
than a few negative reactions from employees to justify the employer's restric-
tion of [the plaintiffs] speech.").
298. Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp. 782,
790 (S.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1981); see
also Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 1979) ("[Finding
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ferent than many other religious practices an employer may
be required to accommodate, even though they "might be per-
ceived as 'disturbing' to others. 299
In short, an employer that categorically prohibits work-
place religious proselytizing because other employees may
find that conduct objectionable °° risks a finding that it has
violated Title VII.3"' As one court has stated:
The objections and complaints of fellow employees, in and
of themselves, do not constitute undue hardship in the
conduct of an employer's business. If employees are dis-
gruntled because an employer accommodates its work
rules to the religious needs of one employee ... such
grumbling must yield to the single employee's right to
practice his religion .... [However, it] is conceivable that
employee morale problems could become so acute that
they would constitute an undue hardship. The EEOC ...
has noted the possibility of undue hardship when the em-
ployer can make a persuasive showing that employee dis-
302
content will produce chaotic personnel problemsY.
The preceding discussion suggests that an employer must
that a proposed accommodation would entail some form of discrimination
[against other employees] does not end the inquiry.").
299. Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1020 (4th Cir. 1996);
see Berg, supra note 1, at 996 ("A wide spectrum of viewpoints may offend ad-
herents of particular religions."); see also Charlotte Elizabeth Parsons, Doing
Justice and Loving Kindness: A Comment on Hostile Environments and the Re-
ligious Employee, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 643, 660 (1997) ("Just about any
behavior could be considered religiously offensive to someone.").
300. See Parsons, supra note 299, at 653 ("Other employees may find [relig-
ious] activities offensive or bothersome, particularly if they are the target of the
conduct as in the case of proselytizing."); see also Stern, supra note 1, at 1365
("In many cases in our Westernized society, with its strongly held notions of re-
ligious privacy ... attempting to force people into compliance with religious
norms is sure to be resented by many . . ").
301. See Burns v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1978)
("[U]ndue hardship requires more than proof of some fellow-worker's grumbling
or unhappiness with a particular accommodation to a religious belief."); see also
Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1439 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
("[S]imply alleging the need to avoid ... harassment is not enough."); cf. EEOC
v. Arlington Transit Mix Inc., 734 F. Supp. 804, 809 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (holding
that an employer had not violated Title VII in part because it had permitted an
employee who was alleging religious discrimination "to proselytize coworkers on
the job"), rev'd on other grounds, 957 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1991).
302. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1975) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted), affd by an equally divided Court, 429
U.S. 65 (1976), vacated on reh'g, 433 U.S. 903 (1977); see also John H. Bern-
stein, Note, 9 CREIGHTON L. REv. 795, 808 (1976) (quoting Cummins).
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balance a proselytizing employee's statutory right to an ac-
commodation against its own countervailing right to prevent
workplace disruption0 3 and maintain production.0 4 Indeed,
one court has noted that an approach which balances "the re-
ligious interest of the employee against the business interest
of the employer" is "the only one which conforms to the
[statutory] language."3 °5
Although its reading of Hardison is questionable,' other
aspects of the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Wilson v. U.S. West
Communications"7 reflect the type of balancing suggested by
this analysis.0 8 The Wilson court clearly recognized that em-
ployers have both a statutory obligation to accommodate an
employee's religious views3 9 and a countervailing right to
prevent workplace disruption.10 It then effectively held that
by offering the plaintiff the option of covering her anti-
abortion button while she was working,"' the employer had
properly balanced these competing interests."2
In particular, the employer offered the plaintiff an ac-
commodation that would have permitted her to comply with
her religious vow to wear the button,3"3 while simultaneously
respecting her coworkers' desire not to be exposed to a form of
religious expression they found to be "offensive and disturb-
303. See Pagana-Fay v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 797 F. Supp. 462,
474 (D. Md. 1992) ("The protection afforded by Title VII is not absolute, and...
otherwise protected conduct may be so disruptive or inappropriate as to fall out-
side the statute's protection.").
304. See Rollins v. Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 401 (11th
Cir. 1989) (observing that "the protection afforded by [Title VII] is not absolute,"
but must be balanced against "an employer's legitimate demand[] for.., a gen-
erally productive work environment").
305. Drazewski v. Waukegan Dev. Ctr., 651 F. Supp. 754, 757 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
306. See supra notes 273-305 and accompanying text.
307. Wilson v. U.S. W. Communications, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995).
308. See Marianne C. DelPo, Never on Sunday: Workplace Religious Freedom
in the New Millennium, 51 ME. L. REV. 341, 349 n.62 (1999) (asserting that Wil-
son "was decided as much on the reasonableness of the accommodation of-
fered.., as it was on the undueness of the hardship to be created").
309. See Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1342.
310. See id. at 1341.
311. See id. at 1339-40.
312. See id. at 1340, 1342.
313. See id. at 1342. Another court discussing the Eighth Circuit's decision
in Wilson has explained: "In other words, it was not a requirement of Wilson's
religious vow that she display the button in a place where everyone with whom
she came in contact would see it." Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 84
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1581, 1591 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
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ing.' ' 4 The plaintiffs acceptance of this accommodation thus
would have eliminated the "time robbing" problems315 and
other workplace disruption that had been caused by her co-
workers' reactions to her means of expressing her religious
beliefs .16
In most situations, the balancing of interests this ap-
proach requires will be highly fact-sensitive.317 Thus, the ex-
tent of an employer's duty to accommodate religious prosely-
tizing will typically need to be resolved on an ad hoc basis,318
with other Title VII cases likely to be of relatively little assis-
tance." 9 As one federal appellate court, which was quoted
314. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1339.
315. Id. In this context, "time robbing" refers to "negative behavior by co-
workers which has a disruptive effect on the workplace." Kaminer, supra note
30, at 110 n.161. One pair of commentators has asserted that "the courts are
reluctant to give way to the religious employee's practices in the face of result-
ing time robbing." Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 15, at 601-02.
316. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1341. Alluding to the plaintiffs refusal to accept the
employer's proposed accommodation, the trial court in Wilson noted that "coop-
eration of both an employee and an employer is needed in finding a 'reasonable
accommodation' that reconciles an employee's religious practices or beliefs with
the needs of an employer's business." Wilson v. U.S. W. Communications, Inc.,
860 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Neb. 1994), affd, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995) (quot-
ing Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986)). As another court
has explained:
A mutuality of obligation inheres in the employer-employee relation-
ship. Title VII does not supplant this mutuality, but, using it as a nec-
essary background, simply adds detail to certain areas of the relation-
ship which are to remain free of discrimination. [The reasonable
accommodation provision] thus has little meaning if it is considered
only at an abstract level apart from the complementary nature of the
duties that employer and employee owe one another, for a successful
accommodation will rarely be possible unless employer and employee
make mutual efforts.
Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th Cir. 1977).
317. See Kalsi v. New York City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745, 757
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Whether accommodation of an employee's religious practice
would cause an employer undue hardship must be determined based on the par-
ticular factual context of each case.") (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted), affd 189 F.3d 461 (2d Cir. 1999); Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 15, at
607 ("Exactly how far the accommodation requirement should extend is a diffi-
cult question that must be addressed in each individual context in which an
employee requests [an] accommodation.").
318. See Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[TIhe pre-
cise reach of the employer's obligation to [accommodate] its employees ... must
be determined on a case-by-case basis.") (quoting Beadle v. Hillsborough County
Sheriffs Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 592 (11th Cir. 1994)).
319. See Padon v. White, 465 F. Supp. 602, 608 (S.D. Tex. 1979) ("Each of the
cases in this area of the law must in effect stand on its own feet. No cases will
be located which are completely identical to one another on the facts."). See
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
with approval by the trial court in Wilson,' has observed:
The term "reasonable accommodation" is a relative term
and cannot be given a hard and fast meaning. Each case
involving such a determination necessarily depends upon
its own facts and circumstances, and comes down to a de-
termination of "reasonableness" under the unique circum-
stances of the individual employer-employee relation-
ship.32'
However, one court has suggested, in a slightly different
context, that employers consider the following factors when
engaging in this type of balancing: "Pertinent considerations
include whether the [expression] impairs discipline by superi-
ors or harmony by coworkers, has a detrimental impact on
close working relationships for which personal loyalty and
confidence are necessary, impedes the performance of the
speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of
the enterprise.
'3 22
In addition, employers addressing workplace religious
proselytizing may be able to glean further guidance from the
relatively well-developed rules governing their right to regu-
late union solicitation,323 a form of workplace speech protected
under another important federal labor statute,324 the National
generally Wilson, 860 F. Supp. at 672 ("The scope of an employer's duty to rea-
sonably accommodate an employee's religious practices or beliefs ... is not
clearly defined by case law.").
320. See Wilson, 860 F. Supp. at 672.
321. Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 902-03 (7th Cir. 1978).
322. Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1436 (C.D. Cal.
1994) (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)); cf. Altman v.
Minn. Dep't of Corr., 80 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1166, 1170-71 (D. Minn.
1999) ("In determining whether an activity negatively affects the effective func-
tioning of the employer's enterprise, consideration is given to whether the re-
ligious exercise creates disharmony in the workplace, impedes the employee's
ability to perform his duties, or impairs working relationships with other em-
ployees.") (internal punctuation and citation omitted).
323. This analogy has generally been ignored by the courts and other com-
mentators, even though the "law on no-solicitation rules is of particularly wide
practical application to employers." Sandusky Mall Co., 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1191, 1199 (1999) (Hurtgen, dissenting).
324. See generally Local No. 1 (ACA), Broadcast Employees of Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 419 F. Supp. 263, 277 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
("Free speech is clearly fundamental to the national labor policy."), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 614 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1980); Riesbeck Food Mkts., Inc., 315
N.L.R.B. 940, 941 (1994) (noting that "freedom of speech has long been a basic
tenet of Federal labor policy") (citing Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,
270 (1974)).
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Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 3 25 The merits of this approach
are discussed in the following section.326
V. ANALOGIZING RELIGIOUS PROSELYTIZING AND UNION
SOLICITATION
A. The Treatment of Union Solicitation Under the NLRA
Sections 7327 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA3 28 make it unlawful
for an employer to interfere with or restrain employees in the
exercise of their statutory right to organize or "engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection.3 29  These provi-
sions have been interpreted as making employee efforts to
solicit union support a category of statutorily protected
speech.339
However, the statutory right to engage in union solicita-
tion is not absolute,33' and must be balanced against the em-
ployer's right "to limit the use of its premises and to require
employees on the payroll to work in return for their wages."33
325. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). The Supreme Court and other courts "have
drawn analogies to the NLRA in other Title VII contexts, and have noted that
certain sections of Title VII were expressly patterned after the NLRA." Hishon
v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 76 n.8 (1984) (authorities omitted); see also
EEOC v. Guardian Pools, Inc., 828 F.2d 1507, 1512 (11th Cir. 1987).
326. See infra notes 327-424 and accompanying text.
327. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
328. Id. § 158(a)(1).
329. Id. § 157. For an academic discussion of the statutory right to engage in
concerted activities, see B. Glenn George, Divided We Stand: Concerted Activity
and the Maturing of the NLRA, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 509 (1988).
330. See Wolfson Mfg. Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 970, 973 (1972) (noting that "an em-
ployee's right to self-organization includes the right to solicit union member-
ship"); Nat'l Plywood, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 1285, 1287 (1968) (discussing an em-
ployee's "statutorily protected union solicitation"); Sarah Korn, Note, Property
Rights and Job Security: Workplace Solicitation by Nonemployee Union Organ-
izers, 94 YALE L.J. 374, 374 (1984) ("The right of self-organization granted em-
ployees by section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act includes a right to en-
gage in workplace union solicitation.") (footnotes omitted).
331. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 326 (1974) (stating that "the
rights of solicitation of employees by employees concerning § 7 rights are not
absolute"); Rest. Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 827 F.2d 799, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Bork, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The right to solicit for
union membership at the workplace ... is not without limitation.").
332. Typoservice Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 1180, 1188 (1973); see also Econolite
Div. of Altec Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 677, 684 (1974) (stating that an employer is
"entitled to require that [its employees] spend their working time, for which
they are paid, performing productive work").
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Stated another way, although employees have a "statutory
right.., to engage in union solicitation at their place of
work," '333 they can be prohibited from exercising that right in a
manner that disrupts production.334
The federal agency charged with responsibility for ad-
ministering and enforcing the NLRA,"5 the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB" or the "Board"),336 has struck this
balance in favor of a rule that generally permits employers to
prohibit their employees from engaging in statutorily pro-
tected speech during "working time."337 The Board holds that
prohibiting union solicitation during working time38 is per-
missible because such a prohibition "is presumed to be di-
rected toward, and to have the effect of, preventing interfer-
ence with production."
3 39
On the other hand, employers generally cannot prohibit
their employees from engaging in union solicitation during
nonworking time,340 even though some employees may object
333. Daylin, Inc., Discount Div., 198 N.L.R.B. 281, 281 (1972), enforced, 496
F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1974).
334. See Denver Tent & Awning Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 586, 588 (1943) (Reilly, con-
curring) (noting that employers can place "reasonable" limitations on workplace
union solicitation in order to "avert[] disruption of production").
335. See Rochester Joint Bd. v. NLRB, 896 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1990); ITT
Lamp Div. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989, 992 (1st Cir. 1970); Driscoll v. Carpenters
Dist. Counsel, 536 A.2d 412, 415 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
336. For an academic discussion of the Board's role in enforcing the NLRA,
see William P. Murphy, The National Labor Relations Board - An Appraisal, 52
MINN. L. REV. 819 (1968).
337. Our Way, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 394, 395 (1983).
338. The Board draws a distinction between "working time" and "working
hours." See Robert's Tours & Transp., Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 13, 14 (1987). A rule
prohibiting solicitation during "working hours" is presumptively unlawful, "be-
cause that term connotes periods from the beginning to the end of work shifts,
periods that include the employees' own time." Our Way, 268 N.L.R.B. at 394-
95.
339. Daylin, Inc., Discount Div., 198 N.L.R.B. 281, 281 (1972), enforced, 496
F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1974); see also Beverly Enters.-Haw., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 335,
365 (1998) (Chairman Gould, dissenting) (observing that "rules that may - in
certain circumstances - restrict Section 7 activity during working time ... serve
the fundamental and legitimate business purpose of maintaining production
and discipline"); cf. NLRB v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 277 F.2d 759, 762 (5th
Cir. 1960) ("The employer may not muzzle its employees, but it may expect full
and undiverted attention to its affairs while the employee is actively at the post
of his duties.").
340. See Rest. Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 827 F.2d 799, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see
also St. Agnes Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 871 F.2d 137, 143 (1989) (observing that "a
ban on union solicitation.., during free time or in nonworking areas is pre-
sumptively invalid").
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to being solicited at any time.34' This form of workplace
speech does not lose its statutory protection "simply because a
solicited employee ... feels 'bothered' or 'harassed' or 'abused'
when fellow workers seek to persuade him or her about the
benefits of unionization."
34 2
One Board administrative law judge4 3 explained this ex-
pansive interpretation of the right to engage in union solicita-
tion .. in the following terms:
[T]he right of employees to discuss unionism, pro or con,
necessitates that the exercise of those rights not be limited
to situations where participants are in agreement. Dis-
agreement is a normal part of discussion. Annoyance to
some on some occasions is unavoidable.... [T]here inevi-
tably will be some employees personally annoyed by per-
sistent pro or antiunion proselytizing. Those so annoyed
have no individual right under the [NLRA] to handcuff the
345free speech of others with whom they do not agree.
In summary, union solicitation during nonworking time
cannot be prohibited,346 even if it occurs on company prop-
erty,34 7 unless it is disruptive or otherwise interferes with
341. See, e.g., Comm. Hosps. of Cent. Cal., Nos. 32-CA-15864 et al., 1998
NLRB LEXIS 710, at *90 (Sept. 18, 1998) (referring to "an employee who ob-
jects to union solicitation in the cafeteria"). See generally NLRB v. Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co., 277 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1960) ("Solicitation comprehends the
approach by one or more advocates for a cause to those who are either uncom-
mitted or even hostile with a view of persuading such persons to a contrary
course of action.").
342. Greenfield Die & Mfg. Corp., 161 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1039, 1040 (1998); see
also Arcata Graphics/Fairfield, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 541, 542 (1991) (noting that
"lawful attempts by union supporters to persuade employees" may be "subjec-
tively offensive to the solicited employees"). But cf. NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co.,
409 F.2d 1247, 1250 (3d Cir. 1969) (asserting that "the employee retains the
right to insulate himself against offensive solicitation").
343. Hearings involving alleged violations of an employee's right to solicit
union support under section 10 of the NLRA are held before administrative law
judges, whose decisions are then subject to Board review. See 29 C.F.R. §§
102.15-16, 102.34, 102.45(a) & 102.48(b) (1999).
344. See generally Korn, supra note 330, at 375 (referring to the "broad policy
governing workplace solicitation by employees") (citing Republic Aviation Corp.
v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945)).
345. Hanes Hosiery, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 338, 350 (1975).
346. In this context, "nonworking" time presumably refers to "the soliciting
and solicited employees' own time." Sunbeam Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. 950, 961
(1970) (emphasis added).
347. See Capitol Records, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 1041, 1044 (1974) (observing
that "an employer may not prohibit... union solicitation in working areas
during nonworking time"); cf. Martin Processing, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1242, 1246
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
production.348 As the Board has stated:
[T]ime outside working hours, whether before or after
work, or during luncheon or rest periods, is an employee's
time to use as he wishes without unreasonable restraint,
although the employee is on company property. It is
therefore not within the province of an employer to prom-
ulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation by
an employee outside of working hours, although on com-
pany property. 9
B. Extending the Board's Treatment of Statutorily Protected
Speech to Title VII Cases Involving Religious
Proselytizing
The propriety of extending these NLRA principles to Title
VII cases is suggested by the fact that the types of speech pro-
tected under both statutes trace their origins to the First
Amendment.35° Thus, permitting employers to prohibit statu-
(1976) (discussing an employee's "protected Section 7 right to engage in union
solicitation of her fellow employees on her own time and at nonwork areas
within the plant").
348. See A. S. Beck Shoe Corp., 92 N.L.R.B. 1457, 1473 (1951) (indicating
that an employer can limit union solicitation "to prevent disruptions of its busi-
ness .... regardless of whether such activity is conducted on the employee's own
or free time"); cf. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 357, 358 (7th Cir.
1956) ("[In its application to organizational activities, the protective mantle of
section 7 is tempered by the employer's right to exact a day's work for a day's
pay.., and does not reach activities which inherently carry with them a ten-
dency toward, or likelihood of, disturbing efficient operation of the employer's
business.").
349. Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d
1009 (5th Cir. 1944). For previous academic discussions of the Board's treat-
ment of union solicitation, see John H. Fanning, Union Solicitation and Distri-
bution of Literature on the Job - Balancing the Rights of Employers and Em-
ployees, 9 GA. L. REV. (1975), and Ralph M. Dereshinsky, The Solicitation and
Distribution Rules of the NLRB, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 417 (1971).
350. Compare Jordan v. N.C. Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172, 180 (W.D.N.C.
1975) ("Congress, as evidenced by the debates relating to the 1972 amendments
to Title VII felt [that the provision requiring accommodation of religious speech]
furthered First Amendment freedoms."), rev'd on other grounds, 565 F.2d 72(4th Cir. 1977), with Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945)("[E]mployers' attempts to persuade to action with respect to joining or notjoining unions are within the First Amendment's guaranty.... The Constitu-
tion protects no less the employees' converse right.") and Am. Elec. Power Co.,
302 N.L.R.B. 1021, 1024 n.1 (1991) (Chairman Stephens, concurring) (observing
that First Amendment concepts "are relevant, of course, when rules applying to
activities protected by Sec. 7 are involved, because vague restrictions on such
activities as union solicitation could chill the exercise of those protected rights").
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torily protected speech during working time,35' but generally
not during an employee's own time, may be equally appro-
priate in Title VII cases involving employee religious prosely-
tizing.
53
First, employers attempting to address religious prosely-
tizing are no less entitled to maintain production than em-
ployers regulating speech protected by the NLRA.35 4 In fact, it
is clear from the legislative history that Title VII was not in-
tended to "diminish traditional management prerogatives,"355
and maintaining production is such a prerogative.3 5 ' Thus,
351. See, e.g., Beasley v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 940 F.2d 1085, 1087 (7th
Cir. 1991) (discussing an employer's rule that "proselytizing on company time
was not permitted"); Silo v. CHW Med. Found., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 825, 829 (Ct.
App. 2001) (referring to a "rule prohibiting religious discussions during work
time"); Brown v. Polk County, 832 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (S.D. Iowa 1993) ("Al-
lowing supervisors and employees to witness and pray on [company] time would
work an undue hardship .... "), affd in part and rev'd in part, 61 F.3d 650 (8th
Cir. 1995).
352. See, e.g., Kelly v. Mun. Court, 852 F. Supp. 724, 731 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (in-
dicating that employees should be "free... to evangelize while not working").
While acknowledging the inherently "economic" nature of the workplace, one
religious scholar has nevertheless asserted that "free periods before, during and
after work can be opportunities for appropriate faith sharing." FRANK P.
DESIANO, THE EVANGELIZING CATHOLIC 47, 53 (1998).
353. See Estlund, supra note 96, at 738-39 ("[Gliven the employer's recog-
nized power under the NLRA to limit workplace discourse where necessary to
maintain production or discipline, it requires no great departure to allow the
employer to restrict workplace discourse ... in order to maintain an atmosphere
of tolerance and equality.") (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
See generally Our Way, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 394, 394 (1983) ("'Working time is for
work' is a long-accepted maxim of labor relations."') (quoting Peyton Packing
Co., 49 N.L.R.B. at 843).
354. See Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260 (4th Cir.
1998) ("Title VII was not intended to immunize... [un]productive behavior at
work.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Garrett v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 395 F. Supp. 117, 124 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (asserting that the "overriding"
policy consideration in Title VII cases is "efficient and trustworthy workman-
ship assured through fair and.., neutral employment and personnel decisions")
(quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)), affd,
531 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1976).
355. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206-07 (1979); see
also Reid v. Memphis Publ'g Co., 521 F.2d 512, 518 (6th Cir. 1975) ("The legisla-
tive history of the 1964 Act indicates that Congress was concerned that man-
agement prerogatives should be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possi-
ble .... ") (citing H.R. REP. NO. 914, at 29 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2516).
356. See Contreras v. City of L.A., 656 F.2d 1267, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981) (dis-
cussing "an employer's right to seek maximum employee productivity and effi-
ciency"); Beverly Enters.-Haw., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 335, 340 (1998) (Brame, con-
curring) (referring to the "management prerogative to maintain production"); cf.
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courts in Title VII religious discrimination cases have specifi-
cally held that a loss of production imposes "more than a de
minimis cost" on the employer,357 thus relieving it of any duty
to adopt a religious accommodation that would impede pro-
duction.358
On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that
workplace religious proselytizing is inherently more disrup-
tive than union solicitation,' which "[b]y its nature ... may
be disruptive to the maintenance and operation of the em-
ployer's business and essential internal discipline.""36 Indeed,
while proselytizing that rises to the level of actionable har-
assment obviously may disrupt the workplace,361 less strident
forms of proselytizing36. are unlikely to have the same im-
pact.
36 3
Mitchell v. Visser, 529 F. Supp. 1034, 1043 (D. Kan. 1981) (referring to "man-
agement's recognized prerogative to maintain internal discipline and a stable
working environment").
357. Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1380 (6th Cir. 1994); see also
Stevenson v. Southport, Inc., 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1789, 1792 (E.D.
La. 1997) (finding that a "loss of production would require [the employer] to
bear more than a de minimis cost").
358. See Cooper, 15 F.3d at 1380; cf. Lee v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d
1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that "loss of production... can amount to
undue hardship").
359. See Tucker v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1215 n.8 (9th Cir. 1996)(finding "nothing... to indicate that religious materials are more likely to dis-
rupt harmony in the workplace than any other materials on potentially contro-
versial topics such as ... labor relations"). Similarly stated:
To the extent it may be argued that union organizational solicitation
[is] a matter of controversy among employees and therefore might be
expected to be more disruptive than other types of solicitation, I find
such activity to be .. .akin to [religious] proselytizing which also has
the potential to engender passionate feelings among those solicited.
Webco Indus., Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 172, 186 n.10 (1998), enforced, 217 F.3d 1306
(10th Cir. 2000).
360. NLRB v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 277 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1960).361. See Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1439 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) ("[H]arassment may interfere with discipline by superiors or har-
mony with coworkers; it may have a detrimental impact on close working rela-
tionships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary; and it may
interfere with the regular operation of the [employer's business]."); see also
Estlund, supra note 96, at 711 ("Speech that contributes to a hostile workplace
environment... is usually 'disruptive' of workplace relations .... ).
362. See Laycock, supra note 25, at 57 (indicating that proselytizing is only
"sometimes offensive"); Schopf, supra note 37, at 58 (noting that "proselytiza-
tion ... may not be sufficiently pervasive or hostile to rise to the level of har-
assment").
363. See Schopf, supra note 37, at 58 ("Most religious activity in the work-
place will not involve harassment and need not be discouraged."); cf. Goldsmith,
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In addition, one rationale for permitting restrictions on
religious proselytizing,"' union solicitation,65 and various
other forms of statutorily protected workplace speech366 is the
fact that other employees are likely to be a captive audience367
for the individual engaging in the speech.368 However, that is
not necessarily true where the speech takes place during
nonworking time,36 9 because in that situation employees who
supra note 128, at 1438 (stating that "demands to change one's religious beliefs
might be innocuous or merely annoying when coming from.., a co-worker").
364. See, e.g., Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 709 (7th Cir. 1986) (upholding
the discharge of an employee for "proselytizing upon a captive audience"); cf.
Church of the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 1996)
(addressing the contention that "members of a captive audience ... are vulner-
able to religious proselytizing") (internal quotation marks omitted); Campbell v.
Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 509 (8th Cir. 1980) (concluding that "religious prosely-
tizing" should not be "allowed to take place in such a manner as to make it
nearly impossible to 'escape' the preaching").
365. In NLRA cases, the "captive audience" issue typically arises in cases in-
volving "a peculiar sui generis kind of employer 'solicitation."' Beverly Enters.-
Haw., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 335 (1998) (Chairman Gould, dissenting) (emphasis
added); see also Note, NLRB Regulation of Employer's Pre-Election Captive
Audience Speeches, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1236 (1967) (passim). However, it is not
necessarily limited to that situation:
If compulsory convocation of employees for the exposition of antiunion
sentiment is unlawful, a similar round-up for prounion purposes would
be equally so. If any right is involved it is that of the employees. If...
that right is transgressed by involuntary subjection to exhortation
against unions, it is equally traversed by unwilling congregation for
union harangue.
Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 630 (1951).
366. See, e.g., Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1438 (indicating that "sexually ori-
ented" expression is a "formi of protected speech" that may be regulated by an
employer in the interest of "protecting... a captive audience").
367. As the term implies, a "captive" audience is "one which cannot easily
avoid exposure to the speech." State v. Kipf, 450 N.W.2d 397, 407 (Neb. 1990).
For a general academic discussion of this aspect of free speech doctrine, see G.
Michael Taylor, Comment, "I'll Defend to the Death Your Right to Say It... But
Not to Me" - The Captive Audience Corollary to the First Amendment, 1983 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 211.
368. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1246-47 (10th Cir.
1999) (adopting the view that "imposing Title VII liability on an employer for
failing to regulate its employees' harassing speech does not violate the First
Amendment... [because] workers are a captive audience"); Robinson v. Jack-
sonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (noting that
employees are "a captive audience in relation to ... speech that comprises [a]
hostile work environment"); Valerio v. Dahlberg, 716 F. Supp. 1031, 1041 (S.D.
Ohio 1988) (referring to "the captive audience nature of an employment rela-
tionship"). For an extended academic discussion of this issue, see Jessica M.
Karner, Comment, Political Speech, Sexual Harassment, and a Captive
Workforce, 83 CAL. L. REV. 637 (1995).
369. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 888 (Cal. 1999)
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might be offended by the speech will often (but not always). °
be "reasonably free to walk away." '371
This reasoning suggests that, like the NLRA,372 Title VII
generally should require employers to accommodate protected
speech that occurs during nonworking time."' The mere fact
that some employees might be offended by religious prosely-
tizing that takes place even at that time374 does not provide a
sufficient basis for prohibiting speech that is not necessarily
directed at them,375 but instead may be addressed to "other,
perhaps willing, listeners."376 Under this analysis,377 prosely-
(Kennard, J., dissenting) (noting that "during working hours an employee is not
free to go elsewhere to avoid hearing a coworker's offensive speech") (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2029 (2000); Andel Jewelry Corp., 326 N.L.R.B.
507, 508 (1998) (Fox, dissenting in part) ("The ... employees were in effect a
captive audience because they were on working time and were not free to leave
their work stations where the discussion was taking place.").
370. See, e.g., Indus. Acoustics Co. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 717, 721 (4th Cir. 1990)
(describing employees who "were not free to leave the company premises during
the lunch break"); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 503 F. Supp. 383, 402 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) ("The workers.., are a captive audience, who must remain on the
jobsite during the workday and, for security reasons, even during their lunch
break."); Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 1067, 1070 (1969) (discussing
an employer's requirement that "during any... nonworking time (as when
eating or resting) the employees must remain in the lunchroom").
371. Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 872 (Werdegar, J., concurring); see also William B.
Patton Towing Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 64, 81 (1969) (suggesting that an employee
who was "free to leave since he ... was on his own time" would not be a "captive
audience"). See generally Church of the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d
1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 1996) (observing that "people [who] are free to come and
go as they please" are not a "captive audience").
372. See Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d
222, 232 (1st Cir. 1976) (stating that "limitations upon the right of union em-
ployees to engage in 'concerted activity' against their employer provide a helpful
point of comparison" in cases involving speech protected under Title VII).
373. Cf. Banks v. Serv. Am. Corp., 952 F. Supp. 703, 710-11 (D. Kan. 1996)(holding that an employer was required to accommodate its employees' religious
speech where the "recipients" of the speech "could choose whether to encounter
or to avoid an encounter" with the speakers).
374. See, e.g., Flynn v. Me. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 448 A.2d 905, 907 n.2,
909 (Me. 1982) (discussing "complaints" the employer had received about an
employee "proselytizing in the cafeteria among [other] employees").
375. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH.
L. REv. 352, 390 (1985) (discussing proselytizing in which the "religious
speaker's intended audience is a general one").
376. Berg, supra note 1, at 986. See generally Kaminer, supra note 30, at 101
(observing that "employees may voluntarily engage in a religious discussion
which involves proselytizing"); Schopf, supra note 37, at 58 (stating that
"proselytization activity is not always unwelcome").
377. Cf. Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1438 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (stating in a First Amendment case that "the fact that the public
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tizing during nonworking time should be prohibited only if it
is addressed to captive and unwilling listeners,378 or otherwise
demonstrably disrupts the workplace." 9
C. Application of the Distinction Between Working Time and
Nonworking Time in Title VII Cases
In Gillard v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,38° the court distin-
guished between working time and an employee's own time in
analyzing an employer's duty to accommodate a religious
practice protected by Title VII. The plaintiff in Gillard was
discharged for low productivity, 8 ' due in part to her "reading
of the Bible during working hours.""' 2 The plaintiff brought
suit under Title VII383 claiming that her termination on this
basis constituted unlawful religious discrimination.8 4
The court disagreed.385  Noting that an employer is not
required to accommodate a religious practice that causes un-
due hardship to the conduct of its business,386 the court held
would be offended by the speech of a public employee is not a sufficient basis for
disciplining the employee, as long as the speech does not interfere with the em-
ployee's duties").
378. Because their listeners would be a captive audience (and their conduct
potentially disruptive), even nonworking employees presumably can be prohib-
ited from proselytizing "in an area where [other] employees are working or per-
forming company functions." NLRB v. Mueller Brass Co., 501 F.2d 680, 685 n.6
(5th Cir. 1974) (NLRA case); cf. Hampton v. Conso Prods., Inc., 808 F. Supp.
1227, 1234 (D.S.C. 1992) (indicating that it is not a violation of Title VII to dis-
cipline an employee for conduct that is "disruptive to the production and morale
of her co-workers").
379. See Richards, supra note 199, at 758 ("There is little doubt that some
employee speech and proselytizing can cause controversy or significantly reduce
the efficiency of the workplace."); cf. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1439 ("[Slimply
alleging the need to avoid... harassment is not enough.... [Tihe [employer]
must show that the threat of disruption is 'actual, material and substantial."')
(quoting Roth v. Veterans Admin., 856 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1988)).
380. Gillard v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1274
(E.D. Pa. 1983).
381. See id. at 1276. See generally Thermidor v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 683 F.
Supp. 403, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("It is widely acknowledged that reasons such as
low productivity ... constitute legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons justifying
discharge.").
382. Gillard, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1276.
383. See id. at 1274.
384. See id. at 1276.
385. See id.
386. See id. (citing Cooper v. Gen. Dynamics, Convair Aerospace Div., 533
F.2d 163, 170 (5th Cir. 1976), reh'g denied, 537 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1977)).
There was no contention that the plaintiffs Bible reading was not a "religious
practice" within the meaning of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994); cf.
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that the employer was entitled to prohibit its employee from
engaging in religious activity during working time.387 In
reaching this result, the court emphasized that the plaintiff
had not been prohibited from reading the Bible during her
breaks.388
This reasoning has occasionally been extended to relig-
ious proselytizing.388 In Kelly v. Municipal Court,"' for exam-
ple, the court indicated that an employer could properly disci-
pline an employee for reading the Bible and "proselytizing his
religious beliefs during working hours,"8 ' if he "remained free
to study the Bible and to evangelize while not working."3 2 As
in the analogous NLRA context,8 3 the presumption underly-
ing this holding is that religious proselytizing and other
statutorily protected forms of expression are unlikely (or at
least less likely)8 4 to disrupt the workplace if they are permit-
Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1061 (10th Cir. 1990) (Barrett, J., dissent-
ing) (describing an employee's "desire to read from his Bible" as the "exercise of
a religious practice").
387. See Gillard, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1276; see also
LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 55, at 245 n.160 (citing Gillard for the
proposition that an employer need not accommodate religious activities "during
working time").
388. See Gillard, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1276 n.5. See generally
Helland v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 93 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1996) (discuss-
ing an employee's "right to carry his Bible to work and to read the Bible in pri-
vacy during job breaks").
389. See Tucker v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1211 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996)
(suggesting that an employer could lawfully discipline a proselytizing employee
whose conduct caused him to spend "more time than other employees in non-
work related conversation," or otherwise "diverted him from doing his job effec-
tively"); WOLF, supra note 23, at 131 ("[T]he employer can squelch the activity
if... an employee's religious proselytizing causes the workplace to be less pro-
ductive... because the employee spends time talking when he or she should
have been working ... ").
390. Kelly v. Mun. Court, 852 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
391. Id. at 729; cf. Brown v. Polk County, 832 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (S.D. Iowa
1993) (holding that an employer was not required to accommodate an em-
ployee's "need to pray and quote scripture during working hours"), af/d in part
and rev'd in part, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995).
392. Kelly, 852 F. Supp. at 731.
393. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gale Prods., Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 337 F.2d
390, 392-93 (7th Cir. 1964) (Kiley, J., dissenting) (finding "no evidence... to
show that [union] solicitation on nonworking time would disrupt work").
394. The Board has acknowledged that there are circumstances in which an
employer may legitimately conclude that union solicitation by employees even
during nonworking time would "disrupt its business." McDonald's Corp., 205
N.L.R.B. 404, 408 (1973); see also Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697, 697 (1960)
(stating that "rules which prohibit union solicitation.., on company property
by employees during their nonworking time... may be validated by evidence
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ted only during nonworking time. 9'
A similar result was reached in Quental v. Connecticut
Commission on the Deaf & Hearing Impaired."6 The plaintiff
in Quental was employed by a state agency that provided in-
terpreting services for deaf and hearing-impaired clients.97
While working on these assignments, the plaintiff occasion-
ally shared her personal religious beliefs with clients for
whom she was interpreting.9
When the plaintiffs employer received notice of the first
such incident, her supervisor verbally counseled her about
her inappropriate conduct,399 which was contrary to her pro-
fessional ethical obligation not to "counsel, advise or inject
personal opinions" while providing interpreting services."°
After its receipt of a subsequent complaint concerning similar
conduct with another client, the employer issued the plaintiff
a formal written reprimand.4 ' This reprimand stated that
while the plaintiff was "free to hold her religious beliefs and
live by her religious convictions, during the time she [was]
being paid ... to provide interpreting services, she should not
promote her religious beliefs.""2
After receiving this reprimand, the plaintiff filed suit un-
der Title VII.43  Among other things, she claimed that the
employer violated the Act by disciplining her for expressing
that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order to maintain pro-
duction or discipline").
395. See generally Quental v. Conn. Comm'n on the Deaf & Hearing Im-
paired, 122 F. Supp. 2d 133, 138 (D. Conn. 2000) (indicating that "speech which
is proven to be disruptive to the employer or to the workplace is not protected
speech").
396. 122 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D. Conn. 2000).
397. See id. at 135-36.
398. See id. at 136-37.
399. See id.
400. Id. at 136. See generally Nabisco Foods Co., 82 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
1186, 1191 (1984) (Allen, Arb.) (indicating that "an employee dealing directly
with the employer's customers [has] a special duty to conduct himself in an ex-
emplary manner").
401. See Quental, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 137.
402. Id. at 142 (bracketing altered); cf. Silo v. CHW Med. Found., 103 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 825, 829 (Ct. App. 2001) (describing an employee who was "warned not
to engage in [religious] discussions on company time"). See generally Pagana-
Fay v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 797 F. Supp. 462, 474 (D. Md. 1992)
("Although [an employee has] every right to speak out on behalf of her cause
and to be [an] activist. . . , she [goes] too far when she permit[s] her beliefs to
adversely affect her day-to-day employment activities.").
403. See Quental, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 135, 137.
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her religious views to clients while on work assignment,4 4 be-
cause it did not attempt to accommodate her beliefs, and
could not establish that doing so would have constituted an
undue hardship.45 The employer in turn argued that it had,
in fact, reasonably accommodated the plaintiffs religious
practices, and that it could not have accommodated her fur-
ther without undermining its mission, purpose, and credibil-
ity with its clients.0 6
The court agreed with the employer on both points.0 7 It
held that allowing the plaintiff to continue to promote her re-
ligious views to clients would have constituted an undue
hardship because it would have permitted her to violate a
professional obligation4 8 to which both she and the employer
were ethically and contractually bound. 9  Without referring
to the Board's analogous approach to speech protected under
the NLRA,1 ° the court further held that the employer had
reasonably accommodated the plaintiffs religious practices
because it "did not restrict [her] from sharing her religious
beliefs or religious tracts with others outside of the context of
providing interpreting services to her clients, for example,
with her co-workers or non-clients. 11
D. The "Disparate Treatment" Exception to the Employer's
Right to Prohibit Statutorily Protected Speech During
Working Time
Under the approach suggested here, employers may pro-
hibit their employees from proselytizing during working time
404. See id. at 135.
405. See id. at 136, 141-42.
406. See id. at 141. See generally Padon v. White, 465 F. Supp. 602, 607-08
(S.D. Tex. 1979) ("[An employer has an affirmative obligation under Title VII to
attempt to accommodate his operations to his employee's religious beliefs. An
employer may demonstrate that he has complied with his legal obligation by
showing any additional accommodation would involve 'undue hardship."').
407. See Quental, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 136 ("[T]he court concludes that... the
[employer] reasonably accommodated [the plaintiffs] religious practices, and to
the extent that it did not, it could not do so without undue hardship.").
408. See id. at 142.
409. See id. at 136.
410. See generally Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology,
545 F.2d 222, 233 (1st Cir. 1976) ("[T]he competing interests that weigh against
granting employees carte blanche protection are the same in the NLRA and Ti-
tle VII contexts: the employer's right to run his business must be balanced
against the rights of the employee . . ").
411. Quental, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
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regardless of whether such conduct would rise to the level of
religious harassment.412 However, this is generally true only
if the employer also prohibits its employees from engaging in
comparable nonreligious "proselytizing" during working
413
Apart from its affirmative statutory duty to accommodate
its employees' religious practices,414 an employer may be liable
for restricting workplace religious proselytizing under Title
VII's more traditional disparate treatment theory415 if it does
not similarly restrict speech that is not religiously moti-
vated. 46  This theory permits an employee to recover if she
can establish that she "is, or was, treated less favorably than
others because of her religious beliefs."417 As one commenta-
tor has stated:
If the employer has singled out religious speech for re-
striction, while permitting other kinds of speech to go un-
restricted, then the speaker himself will be able to claim
that he has been discriminated against in the terms and
conditions of his employment on the basis of his religion.
The employee in such a case asserts a simple theory of
disparate treatment on the basis of religion.418
Once again, this limitation on the employer's right to
412. See Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1438 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (suggesting that an employer may restrict its employees' nonharass-
ing workplace expression "during hours in which their freedom is already re-
stricted by the necessities of [their] duties").
413. See generally Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 825 n.1
(5th Cir. 1999) (Jolly, J., dissenting) ("Free market enthusiasts and environ-
mentalists can attempt to 'proselytize' as well as Baptists and Mormons."); see
also Berg, supra note 1, at 971 (observing that "an employee may bother and
annoy other employees about political or social topics").
414. See generally Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 15, at 582 ("[U]nlike other
forms of discrimination, an employee can sue her employer for failure to ac-
commodate her religious beliefs.").
415. See Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1017 (4th Cir.
1996) ("Courts have recognized that employees may utilize two theories in as-
serting religious discrimination claims. These theories are denominated as the
'disparate treatment' and 'failure to accommodate' theories.") (authority omit-
ted).
416. See Tucker v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1215 (9th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that an employer's prohibition of workplace advocacy is "unreason-
able" if "its sole target is religious speech").
417. Mann v. Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1993). For the author's pre-
vious discussion of this employment discrimination theory, see Michael ). Mo-
berly, Reconsidering the Discriminatory Motive Requirement in ADEA Disparate
Treatment Cases, 24 N.M. L. REV. 89 (1994).
418. Berg, supra note 1, at 976.
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regulate religious proselytizing is consistent with the treat-
ment of protected speech under the NLRA.419  The seminal
Board decision in this area is Dutch Boy, Inc. , which held
that an employer violates section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA42" by
discriminatorily applying an otherwise valid rule limiting
union solicitation in the workplace.422 The courts have agreed
with the Board's conclusion that rules prohibiting solicitation
only during working time423 are unlawful if they are applied
discriminatorily.424
VI. CONCLUSION
Striking the proper balance between a religious em-
ployee's right to proselytize and the right of other employees
to work in an environment free from religious harassment
has been described as the "biggest challenge for the next cen-
419. See generally Rest. Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 827 F.2d 799, 804-05 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) ("The law is clear that a valid no-solicitation rule applied in a dis-
criminatory manner or maintained for discriminatory reasons may not be en-
forced against union solicitation.").
420. Dutch Boy, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 4 (1982), enforced sub nom. Artra Group,
Inc. v. NLRB, 730 F.2d 586 (10th Cir. 1984).
421. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994).
422. See Dutch Boy, 262 N.L.R.B. at 6; see also Predicasts, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B.
1117, 1119 (1984) (citing Dutch Boy for the proposition that an employer's
"[p]romulgation of a rule, though otherwise valid on its face, solely to curtail
union activity and not for any legitimate business purpose, constitutes an unfair
labor practice"). But cf. Sandusky Mall Co., 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1191, 1201
(1999) (Hurtgen, dissenting) (asserting that "the employer may discriminate
among different ... types of conduct when one would alienate customers or oth-
erwise disrupt or retard business and the other would not").
423. See Albertsons, Inc., Southco Div., 289 N.L.R.B. 177, 177 n.3 (1988) (in-
dicating that "no-solicitation rules are facially valid [if] they proscribe solicita-
tion in working areas during working time"); Baddour Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 546,
547 (1986) ("Clearly, to the extent that [an employer's] rule prohibits employees
from engaging in any kind of solicitation during their working time that aspect
of the rule is valid on its face under the Board's decision in Our Way, 268
N.L.R.B. 394 (1983).") (internal punctuation and footnote omitted).
424. See, e.g., Revere Camera Co. v. NLRB, 304 F.2d 162, 165 (7th Cir. 1962)
("[Wihere an employer discriminates in the enforcement of a no solicitation rule
in favor of anti-union solicitation by employees the employer's act is an unfair
labor practice."); NLRB v. Cent. Power & Light Co., 425 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th
Cir. 1970):
A no-solicitation rule that on its face covers work time is presumptively
valid, but only in the absence of evidence that it was enacted for a dis-
criminatory purpose.... [C]overage of non-work time or time when
talk cannot interfere with work, and especially non-coverage of other
subjects of conversation, may give rise to an inference of anti-union
purpose.
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tury in this area of employment law." '425 Because the Act.. it-
self provides no guidance in determining the scope of an em-
ployer's duty to accommodate its employees' religious prac-
tices,"' and the Title VII case law in this area is limited,"
"the dividing line between permissible and unacceptable
proselytizing may be difficult to locate." '429
This article argups that relatively settled rules developed
in cases involving analogous speech protected under the
NLRA can provide much-needed guidance in these Title VII
cases.43  These rules would permit an employer to limit or
prohibit proselytizing during working time,4"' unless it failed
to similarly limit comparable workplace speech that was not
religiously motivated.' However, employers could regulate
religious proselytizing during nonworking time only if that
speech was disruptive, or otherwise interfered with produc-
tion.433 This approach, which has been implicitly followed in a
few Title VII cases,434 would strike a reasonable balance be-
tween the proselytizing employee's statutory right to express
his or her religious beliefs, and the right of the employer435
425. DelPo, supra note 308, at 357.
426. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1994).
427. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)
("[Tihe statute provides no guidance for determining the degree of accommoda-
tion that is required of an employer."); cf. EEOC v. Caribe Hilton Int'l, 597 F.
Supp. 1007, 1011 (D.P.R. 1984) ("There are no exact parameters defining what
constitutes reasonable accommodations.").
428. See Kaminer, supra note 30, at 98 ("[Tlhere [are] few cases involving the
conflict between one employee's right to religious expression and another em-
ployee's right to be free from hostile work environment harassment.").
429. WOLF, supra note 23, at 61-62.
430. See supra notes 326-423 and accompanying text. For an insightful ar-
gument advocating the accommodation of employee religious practices directly
under the NLRA, see Roberto L. Corrada, Religious Accommodation and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 185 (1996).
431. See generally Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology,
545 F.2d 222, 230 (1st Cir. 1976) ("Congress certainly did not mean to grant
sanctuary to employees to engage in [protected speech] on company time ...
432. See supra notes 412-24and accompanying text.
433. See generally Unt v. Aerospace Corp., 765 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir.
1985) ("An employee is not protected by Title VII when he... disrupts the work
environment of his employer, or willfully interferes with the attainment of the
employer's goals.").
434. See supra notes 380-411 and accompanying text.
435. See Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 658 (8th Cir. 1995) (assuming
that the employer "has a legal right to ensure that its workplace is free from re-
ligious activity that harasses or intimidates"); cf. Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
and other employees to a workplace free of harassment and
disruption."6
138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing "the employer's interest in maintaining an
efficient and harmonious operation").
436. See generally Kaminer, supra note 30, at 85 ("Title VII requires an em-
ployer to reasonably accommodate an employee's ... need for religious expres-
sion in the workplace. However, Title VII also ... prohibits religious expression
which is sufficiently harassing.") (footnotes omitted).
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